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Abstract 
 
Exchange of information in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, using new technologies like 
biometric identifiers and creating large-scale centralised EU databases is a highly topical, yet equally 
controversial issue. A number of EU databases and systems of information exchange are already in 
place, others will soon become operational. In spite of this, proposals for new measures and 
mechanisms are frequently tabled; it appears as if the EU is only at the beginning of a ‘new age of 
information exchange’. This working paper aims at taking stock of this development by providing a 
comparative picture of the existing EU JHA databases and EU rules on information exchange, as 
well as some of the main related proposals. The paper also looks at how some databases are used in 
practice and puts forward some suggestions as to how to alleviate concern about data protection.  
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TAKING STOCK: 
DATABASES AND SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE 
FLORIAN GEYER
* 
n the policy area that deals with security, counter-terrorism and ‘unprecedented threats’ new 
ideas and proposals intending to allow public authorities to gather, store, process and 
exchange an increasing amount of personal data are being brought forward in high numbers 
and with increasing frequency. Not even three months had passed, for instance, since 
Commissioner Frattini’s EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) proposal of November 2007
1 when 
in February 2008 he tabled another two other proposals directed at tracking and monitoring 
travellers entering the EU: 1) an ‘entry-exit system’ based on biometric identifiers and 2) a 
system that would oblige travellers to register online before actually departing to Europe (both 
part of the EU Commissions’ so called ‘border package’).
2 Questioning the added-value, 
effectiveness and proportionality of these and many other similar measures is often the 
immediate reaction by parliamentarians, human rights groups, concerned citizens and 
sometimes even member state ministers.
3 “Do we really need yet another intrusive measure 
before we know if the last one we enacted does its job?”, could be a typical reaction; a reaction 
whose underlying concerns should not be easily dismissed, not least because judicial courts also 
seem to be increasingly opposed to some of the advances in granting authorities more and more 
powers and means of surveillance.  
In this regard it might be a mere coincidence – yet with symbolical value – that in the same 
period that the EU Commission presented its ‘border package’, arguing for more and even 
bigger databases on foreign travellers, Advocate General Maduro of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (ECJ), for instance, considered a large-scale national database that 
contains only extensive data on Union citizens (and third-country nationals), but not on its own 
nationals, as discriminatory and in breach of community law.
4 Member state courts have also 
been active in that period, in particular the German Constitutional Court. That Court, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, issued a series of decisions in February and March 2008 that 
                                                      
* Florian Geyer is a Research Fellow in the Justice and Home Affairs Unit of CEPS. This paper falls 
within the framework of CHALLENGE – the Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, a 
research project funded by the Sixth EU Framework Programme of DG Research, European Commission, 
see www.libertysecurity.org. The author would like to thank Daniel Gros, Elspeth Guild and Sergio Car-
rera for their valuable comments. 
1 Copying the US PNR programme, that had led to many bitter reactions among policy makers and the 
public during the German EU presidency of 2007. See Commission Proposal for a Council Framework 
Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, COM(2007) 654 
final, 6.11.2007. 
2 Commission Communication, Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union, 
COM(2008) 69 final, 13.2.2008. For an analysis see Guild, Carrera & Geyer, The Commission’s new Bor-
der Package: Does it take us one step closer to ‘Cyber Fortress Europe’?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 154, 
Centre for European Policy Studies: Brussels, March 2008. 
3 Cf. the statements gathered by EurActiv, ‘EU to tighten border controls, critics fear 'Fortress Europe'’, 
14.2.2008 (http://www.euractiv.com/en/justice/eu-tighten-border-controls-critics-fear-fortress-europe/ 
article-170292, last accessed 2.4.2008). 
4 ECJ, Opinion of Advocate General P. Maduro in case C-524/06 (Huber), 3.4.2008. 
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considerably limited or altogether discarded some new data-sensitive security laws in 
Germany:
5 questions of legal certainty and precision, purpose limitation and proportionality 
were among those addressed by the Court. 
It is the sheer number of proposals and enacted measures in this field that could give rise to 
concern, however. In fact, even for professional observers, it is difficult to even glimpse the 
‘security web’ that is currently being spun at national, supranational and transatlantic levels 
alike. What databases and channels of information actually exist? What data is stored and for 
how long? Which states participate and which authorities take part in each system? What are the 
data protection provisions? But above all: how do all the measures taken together interact and 
how can this kind of virtual security architecture transform societies that claim to be liberal and 
democratic? 
The Hague Programme’s vision 
At EU level, improving the exchange of information is one of the main elements of the “The 
Hague Programme”, the multi-annual programme adopted by the European Council in 
November 2004. This political programme constitutes the ‘guiding star’ for policy-making in 
the area of freedom, security and justice for the period 2004-2009.
6 Under the headline 
“Strengthening Security”, EU leaders expressed their conviction that an “innovative approach to 
the cross-border exchange of law-enforcement information” was needed. They stipulated that 
with effect from 1 January 2008 the newly coined “principle of availability” should be the 
governing standard for information flows throughout the Union. This principle entails fast and 
(more or less) direct access for any law enforcement officer to necessary information held in 
any other member state. Full use of new technologies should be made, in order to establish 
reciprocal access to national databases, interoperability as well as direct (online) access to 
existing central EU databases. Under this scenario, the creation of new centralised EU databases 
would only be of secondary importance.
7 The European Council also requested strict 
observance of six key conditions for the development of this innovative approach to the 
exchange of law-enforcement information: 
•  the exchange may only take place in order that legal tasks may be performed, 
•  the integrity of the data to be exchanged must be guaranteed, 
•  the need to protect sources of information and to secure the confidentiality of the data at all 
stages of the exchange, and subsequently, 
•  common standards for access to the data and common technical standards must be applied, 
                                                      
5 On 27.2.2008 the Bundesverfassungsgericht declared unconstitutional the new law of Nordrhein-
Westfalen that would have allowed secret spying of personal computers and internet usage (1 BvR 
370/07, 27.2.2008); on 11.3.2008 it quashed new provisions in the police laws of Hessen and Schleswig 
Holstein, that would have allowed the automatic identification and storage of vehicle registration plates of 
private cars by video cameras without suspicion in order to compare the data with existing police data-
bases (1 BvR 2074/05, 11.3.2008); finally, on that very same day, the Court temporarily suspended some 
aspects of the new federal law that intends to implement the EU data retention directive (1 BvR 256/08, 
11.3.2008). 
6 The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, OJ C 53, 
3.3.2005, p. 1. 
7 “New centralised European databases should only be created on the basis of the studies that have shown 
their added value”, see OJ C 53, 3.3.2005, point 2.1, p. 8. DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 3 
 
•  supervision of respect for data protection, and appropriate control prior to and after the 
exchange must be ensured, 
•  individuals must be protected from abuse of data and have the right to seek correction of 
incorrect data.
8 
Furthermore, as regards border control and migration issues, the European Council embraced 
“biometrics and information systems” (point 1.7.2. of the Hague Programme) as the solutions 
for the future and requested the Schengen Information System II as well as the new Visa 
Information System to be operational in 2007. 
A common EU Policy on Information Sharing? 
Improving the exchange of information in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is an 
important issue, also for the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove. In a 
discussion paper on the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy, he criticised the 
fact that the current structures in the Council, with its multitude of different working parties 
dealing with related files, tended to produce incoherent and sometimes illogical results 
(Counter-terrorism Coordinator, 2007, p. 3). He calls for the adoption of a “Common EU Policy 
on Information Sharing” that will build on the results of an assessment of the practical use of 
EU instruments related to information exchange. Furthermore, in order to ensure consistency 
and efficiency of the work carried out in the Council, he suggests mandating only one single 
Council Working Party/Committee to reflect on, prepare, develop and monitor the 
implementation of this policy. 
The aim of this paper 
This working paper strives to contribute to these developments and ongoing discussions by 
providing a comparative picture of the existing EU JHA databases and EU rules on information 
exchange, as well as some of the main related proposals.
9 In this respect it aims at updating the 
1999 report of the House of Lords EU Select Committee on “European Union databases”; by 
sketching also EU rules on data exchange directly between law enforcement authorities of 
member states, however, it goes beyond that parliamentary inquiry.
  This stocktaking exercise is 
provided in tables. The main objective of the paper is therefore informative in nature.
10 Further 
studies are invited to build on the empirical material provided in the annexes. However, the 
paper also presents some findings that emerged in the preparation of the tables, in particular 
when taking account of the Hague Programme’s plans of 2004 as compared to the situation as of 
April 2008.  
The systems under scrutiny – ‘first’ and ‘third pillar’ issues 
In the comparative tables in Annex 1, the Schengen Information Systems I and II (SIS I and SIS 
II), EURODAC, the Customs Information System (CIS), the Europol Computer System, the 
Eurojust files as well as the Visa Information System (VIS) are displayed in the first set of 
tables. These can be regarded as centralised EU systems. As regards mechanisms of direct 
                                                      
8 Ibid. 
9 In order to limit the scope and to make this task feasible the paper restricts itself to those databases and 
rules that are intended to exchange personal, individualised data. Exchange of statistical data and similar 
general data is therefore not covered. 
10 In this regard it also intends to contribute to the research undertaken by the French team of the CHAL-
LENGE research project, see e.g. Bonditti, 2007. 4 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
information exchange between law enforcement authorities (decentralised), fourteen texts had 
been examined, covering fields like DNA analysis results, football matches, terrorism, passport 
data, criminal records, money laundering, to name a few. Additionally, in this section the 
competing proposals on implementing the principle of availability are analysed. In the third set 
of tables, EU acts that provide common rules on the extraction of genuinely ‘private’ data are 
compared, i.e. data gathered by private parties for private purposes like telecommunication 
companies or airlines.  
Although all these systems can be attributed to the area of freedom, security and justice (see 
Article 2 Treaty on European Union – TEU), they address substantially different issues: 
migration, asylum, free movement on the one hand and police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, including counter-terrorism on the other. Making a distinction between these 
issues is not only mandatory in terms of content (e.g. the movement of persons across borders is 
per se neither a threat nor a crime), but also as regards the institutional EU order. While 
migration, asylum and free movement is located in the so called ‘first pillar’ of the European 
Union and subject (in principle) to the community method, police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters is part of the ‘third’, i.e. the intergovernmental pillar.
11 In contrast to the first, 
this third pillar does not entail proper involvement of EU institutions, but is regarded as an 
exclusive matter of member states. While this pillar duality would eventually be changed by the 
Lisbon Treaty
12, for the time being, it still governs the current setting of EU Justice and Home 
Affairs - with all its negative externalities (see Guild & Carrera, 2005). 
Observations 
Some observations are formulated in the following section that emanate from the work on the 
tables provided in the annexes.  
Uneven participation of EU and non-EU member states: a new ‘democratic deficit’? 
Although the systems under scrutiny are essentially ‘EU systems’ not all EU member states 
participate, at the same time some non-EU states do take part. This is most obvious in the case 
of the current Schengen Information System (SIS). Iceland and Norway as non-EU states 
participate fully, while the EU states Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria are not yet allowed to take 
part. On the other hand, the UK and Ireland, which do not participate in the Schengen free travel 
area, have received permission to be part of the police and criminal law contents of SIS. 
Practical issues, however, have so far prevented these states from actually getting connected to 
the SIS system (House of Lords, 2007, p. 11 and 14). Then there is Switzerland, and most 
recently Liechtenstein, that will soon be joining the system, again two non-EU states. 
Were ‘Schengen’ a purely intergovernmental undertaking one would not necessarily be 
concerned by this situation: whoever is part of the Schengen free travel zone is also part of the 
Schengen Information System, as simple as that. Therefore Iceland, Norway and soon 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein are ‘in’ and the UK and Ireland are partially ‘out’. However, 
since the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the EU legal order (first and third pillar) 
with the Amsterdam Treaty, Schengen has eventually and undoubtedly become supranational in 
                                                      
11 Furthermore, EU counter-terrorism efforts are sometimes located within the ‘second pillar’ as part of 
the EU’s common foreign and security policy.   
12 For an assessment of the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of freedom, security 
and justice, see Carrera & Geyer, “The Reform Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs – Implications for 
the common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, in Guild & Geyer (eds), Security versus Justice? Po-
lice and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2008, pp. 289-307.  DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 5 
 
nature. Yet supranationality was the driving force for developing EU fundamental rights and for 
constantly adding more democratic elements into the constitutional setting of the Union. And 
here comes the problem: the Schengen framework is part of this setting but not all Schengen 
states are part of it. This entails for instance, that the Charter of EU Fundamental Rights – once 
binding with the Lisbon Treaty – will not govern the usage of the Schengen Information System 
by these four non-EU states.  
Furthermore, there is the question of democratic accountability. The Schengen System is 
evolving and each substantive change to it needs a legislative act. The necessary legislation is 
already – at least as regards the first pillar – co-decided by the European Parliament (EP) and 
the Council (and with the Lisbon Treaty in force, co-decision issues will increase 
considerably).While non-EU Schengen states are involved in the Council proceedings via so 
called ‘Mixed Committees’, there are no Icelandic, Norwegian, Swiss or Liechtenstein 
parliamentarians involved when the EP decides on the acts. On the other side of this coin, 
attention must be given to the fact that the EU non-Schengen states the UK and Ireland do have 
‘their’ Members of the European Parliament voting on Schengen immigration and border 
control matters although their governments are excluded from the Council vote, due to their 
non-participation. 
These examples show that an uneven participation of EU states in supranational matters, leads 
to a whole series of contentious and complicated questions that can have negative effects on the 
institutional balance and the situation of the individual. In the area of freedom, security and 
justice, this fragmented participation is an even greater concern, not only due to the direct 
impact the policies have on each and every person, but also because the participation or non-
participation of states is not even consistent. The databases and information systems in this area 
are a particularly good illustration of this: while the UK and Ireland are not participating in the 
migration and border control issues of SIS, they are part of the asylum database EURODAC, 
but not of the visa database VIS. In all of them, however, Iceland, Norway as well as 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein are participating, or will do so. As regards decentralised 
mechanisms of information exchange between law enforcement authorities, the latter participate 
only when the legislative act provides that “it constitutes a development of the provisions of the 
Schengen acquis”. This has been established to be the case, e.g. in the third pillar framework 
decision on simplifying the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities, but 
not in almost all of the other mechanisms, however.  
To establish which states are participating in which systems and mechanisms is consequently a 
rather unpredictable business. This unpredictability, however, might in itself lead to conflicts 
with yet another issue: that of data protection, since to know where personal data are stored and 
processed, by which authority and for what purposes is an essential part of data protection 
standards.
13 
Actual usage of the systems: under- and over-achievers? 
Statistics showing the actual usage of the systems provide a mixed picture. While the SIS 
contains a total of around 22 million valid entries as of 1.1.2008, including objects and persons 
(Council, 2008, p. 1), the Customs Information System (CIS) as of 26.10.2006 featured only 
around 490 active cases with some member states having never entered any data and five 
member states being responsible for 95% of the entries (Council, 2007b, p. 4). As with SIS, CIS 
is also a cross-pillar database that contains entries on persons and objects alike: “CIS was 
created to store information on commodities, means of transport, persons and companies in 
order to assist in preventing, investigating and prosecuting actions which are in breach of 
                                                      
13 See the recent Bundesverfassungsgericht judgement for instance, 1 BvR 2388/03, 10.3.2008. 6 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
customs and agricultural legislation (1st Pillar) or serious contraventions of national laws in the 
application of which the customs administrations have total or partial competence (3rd Pillar)” 
(Council, 2007b, p. 2).  
Although one does expect that CIS is in fact ‘smaller’ as its focus is more limited than SIS, the 
huge discrepancy between entries in the two databases and the fact that only a handful of 
member states seem to be actually interested in the contents of CIS is nevertheless surprising. 
Even more so when considering that in an official leaflet on CIS it is stated that “each year 
throughout the EU, thousands of Customs officers are carrying out thousands of investigations 
on persons or companies suspected of being in breach of Customs, Agricultural or national 
legislations”.
14 If this is the case, then it seems as if these “thousands of customs officers” are 
not too interested in sharing and receiving information from their counterparts in other EU 
member states. 
Involved authorities: blurring boundaries and questions of control and ‘value’ of data 
As stated above, the policies subsumed under the label ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ 
comprise a wide-ranging set of issues that need to be discerned. However, when looking at the 
authorities that have complete or partial access to the databases and systems of information 
exchange, it becomes obvious that the boundaries between these issues become increasingly 
blurred. In the case of SIS, this blurring is part of the system as it contains genuine law 
enforcement information (e.g. persons wanted for arrest) as well as genuine border control and 
immigration law information (e.g. banned third country nationals). Nevertheless, in an effort to 
uphold the boundary each member state has to declare which of its authorities has access to 
which set of SIS data.
15 Yet, in SIS and similarly in other databases and systems, these efforts 
might prove fruitless as member states are essentially free to designate their “competent 
authorities”. They have to inform the Council Secretariat or the Commission about these 
competent authorities, but it does not appear as if any of the EU bodies has the power to reject a 
designation communicated by a member state.  
In the case of Eurodac, for instance, data should only be entered and accessed by national 
authorities in charge of handling asylum requests. However, as the first coordinated inspection 
by data protection authorities has shown, in some member states Eurodac is operated partly or 
entirely by national police services (EDPS, 2007, p. 12). Although that report did not establish 
that Eurodac data had been actually searched for ‘police purposes’, it seems as if this is merely a 
matter of trust, not of possibilities. One might therefore wonder whether the intended proposal 
of granting law enforcement officers access to Eurodac would only formally allow what already 
takes place by the so-called ‘normative power of the factual’. Furthermore, the VIS, the soon-to-
be operational database on visa applicants, will not only be accessible by visa and immigration 
authorities, but also by ‘competent authorities’ of member states as well as Europol for the 
purpose of prevention, detection or investigation of terrorist offences and other serious crime.  
Furthermore it is necessary to mention that some databases and mechanisms also allow 
(normally under certain restrictive conditions) the exchange of information with authorities of 
non-EU states and international organisations. This is the case for CIS and VIS, for the EU-US 
and EU-Canada PNR agreements, the EU-PNR proposal and as regards Europol and Eurojust. 
Yet, extending access to databases and information systems to more and more authorities gives 
rise to another set of questions, concerning among others, those of effective control and ‘value’ 
of the data.  
                                                      
14 http://www.ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/fide/leaflet.pdf (last accessed 4.4.2008).  
15 See Council doc. 6073/2/07 REV 2, 25.6.2007. DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 7 
 
As regards control, in a judgement of 10.3.2008 the Bundesverfassungsgericht reiterated the 
importance for the individual of being able to oversee with sufficient reliability what personal 
information is known to which authorities.
16 Dangers exist, the Court stated, in particular, when 
personal information is used and interlinked in a way that is impossible to monitor or control by 
the individual. Considering this statement in the light of the material gathered in Annex 1, one 
wonders whether the individual whose data has been entered into EU databases or is subject to 
EU systems of information exchange has in fact any chance of finding out about this, let alone 
to controlling it. Although there are provisions that intend to ensure that the individual is duly 
informed and that grant access rights to personal data held, these instruments might be 
insufficient to establish how the personal information has been actually used, interlinked, and 
especially, with which authorities it has been exchanged, and how these authorities have further 
used and exchanged it. 
In this respect it is interesting to note, for instance, that data processed in SIS II shall, in 
principle,  not be transferred to third states or international organisations (article 54 SIS II-
decision). At the same time, however, Europol and Eurojust do have partial access to SIS II data 
and these two bodies are in fact allowed to communicate the information obtained to third 
countries and third bodies, only provided that the member state that entered the data has given 
its consent (article 41(3) SIS II-decision). Whether or not the concerned individual must give his 
consent or be at least informed about his member state’s consenting decision is not regulated by 
the SIS II-decision. 
Finally, as regards the ‘value’ of data, it is worth examining whether the efforts to involve many 
more authorities might actually lead to a decrease in value of the data. As was seen in many 
incidents, authorities compete against each other and information is an important element in this 
struggle (for sociological research on this struggle, see Bigo, 2007). This competition could also 
have been one of the underlying motives of a recent ‘exchange of views’ between authorities in 
Germany. After security authorities successfully foiled a likely terrorist attack in Germany in 
September 2007, police officials complained that, in spite of what was perceived as a 
formidable operation, they were not given sufficient information by the German secret services. 
The latter denied these allegations and stated, that “policemen don’t understand that they don’t 
need to know everything”.
17 If sharing information appears to be a contentious field even within 
one member state, how much more difficult must it be at EU and international level? With 
member states’ authorities knowing that everything they feed into an EU-wide system is 
accessible to potentially all other authorities in the EU and beyond, they might decide to keep 
the really important and valuable information for themselves and share it, perhaps, only on a 
bilateral basis of trust, if at all. 
“Competent authorities”: is there a common understanding among member states?  
The designation of ‘competent authorities’ by member states for the purpose of participating in 
EU databases and systems of information exchange is also interesting from another perspective: 
Is there a common or at least comparable practice among member states?  
When looking at the material provided in Annex 2, the answer must be ‘no’. In that annex, 
information is compiled on how member states responded to the request of designating a 
“competent law enforcement authority” according to article 2a of the Council Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and 
                                                      
16 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1 BvR 2388/03, 10.3.2008, para. 59-61. 
17 Taken from an article entitled: “Polizisten müssen nicht immer alles wissen”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
14.12.2007, p. 6; see also “Lebensgefährliches Schweigen”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.12.2007, p. 2. 8 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European 
Union.
18 This article defines the concept of law enforcement authority as:  
a national police, customs or other authority that is authorised by national law to detect, 
prevent and investigate offences or criminal activities and to exercise authority and 
take coercive measures in the context of such activities. Agencies or units dealing 
especially with national security issues are not covered by the concept of competent 
law enforcement authority. 
Member states had to communicate ‘their’ authorities to the Council Secretariat by 18.12.2007 
and were reminded about this by the Secretariat in October 2007.
19 
When looking at the table in Annex 2, the following aspects are worth mentioning: 
•  Only three member states were able to respond on time to their statutory requirement of 
informing the Council Secretariat about the designation. 
•  A majority of ‘big’ member states and in total some 40% of member states had not 
informed the Council within three months following the deadline. 
•  The practice of designating authorities varies considerably. In the extreme, there is Spain, 
which appears to have designated only a contact point for international police cooperation, 
contrasted with Latvia which has even designated – perfectly in line with the definition –
captains of seagoing vessels of ships under the Latvian flag. Most interesting is the case of 
Austria, which designated a department of its Ministry of Interior as well as district 
administrations. 
•  The position of prosecutors and judges seems to be entirely unsettled. From all member 
states that have submitted their information so far, only the Czech Republic and Latvia 
consider public prosecutors as being competent law enforcement authorities in the sense of 
the framework decision.   
Lack of common data protection standards 
Moving on the to the data protection elements in the EU databases and systems of information 
exchange, it is possible to observe that at least the vast majority of them take account of the 
need to ensure the rights of the data subject; some go further and provide specific and detailed 
requirements. An exception to this is, however, provided by the newly adopted Council 
resolution on the exchange of information related to the expulsion of third country nationals in 
the context of counter-terrorism. This resolution lacks even the faintest reference to the data 
protection rights of concerned individuals. 
Yet although data protection requirements are mainly taken into account, the comparative 
analysis of the databases and systems reveals a considerable lack of common standards. It 
appears, furthermore, as if this lack of common standards is only partially due to the fact that 
while there is a data protection directive governing the ‘first pillar’ Justice and Home Affairs 
issues, there is – until the present day – no comparable horizontal EU ‘third pillar’ data 
protection law (the 2005 Commission’s proposal to remedy this gap
20 is making no progress in 
the Council).  
                                                      
18 OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89. 
19 Council doc. 14258/07, 24.10.2007. 
20 Commission, Proposal for a Council framework decision on the protection of personal data processed 
in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, COM(2005) 475 final, 
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This shall be highlighted by the following, non-exhaustive, examples. 
•  Different time limits for storing data are foreseen within the same subject area. The EU-
Canada PNR agreement provides for a regular storage time of 3.5 years and exceptionally a 
maximum of 6 years. In the EU-US PNR agreement the regular storage time has already 
doubled to 7 years plus a further storage of 8 years in a ‘dormant’ database. The EU’s own 
PNR proposal, finally, considers 5 years as appropriate but also intends to rely on a 
‘dormant phase’ of 8 years. 
•  In most of the legal texts, reference is made to a data protection convention drafted in the 
framework of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg: the “Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data”
21 with subsequent 
amendments and certain recommendations. In some cases, it is stipulated that these Council 
of Europe standards must be ‘taken into account’ or reference is made in the preambles. For 
SIS, SIS II, CIS and VIS it is additionally provided that participating contracting states must 
adopt national rules in order to achieve a level of data protection that is at least equal to this 
Council of Europe standard. Then, in the context of Europol, these national rules must not 
only be adopted, but furthermore that they must be in force before any data can be 
exchanged. However, only in one of the latest proposals, the ‘Prüm Initative’ of 2007,
22 it is 
foreseen that the Council must unanimously decide whether this level of data protection and 
the other data protection requirements established by the proposed Council decision itself 
are satisfied by the participating states.  
•  The European Data Protection Supervisor has not been assigned the competence to monitor 
consistently all EU databases and systems of information exchange in addition to the 
national supervisory authorities. In some databases he is involved (Eurodac, SIS II, VIS), in 
others not. 
•  For many data protection aspects, EU rules provide that national laws are decisive, e.g. as 
regards the requirement to inform the concerned data subject. These national rules, 
however, might differ substantially. 
•  Only in a small minority of legal texts, the idea that data protection requirements could be 
ensured by the technical design of the database or the system of information exchange is 
reflected (‘data protection by design’). An automatic deletion of data once the allowed 
storage period is over, for instance, is foreseen in the FIDE database of CIS. Furthermore, in 
the ‘Prüm Initiative’ it is stated that implementing rules must guarantee that “state-of-the-art 
technical measures are taken to ensure data protection and data security (…)” [article 29 
(2)(a) Prüm Initiative].  
The Hague Programme implemented? 
Finally, has the Hague Programme’s vision on information systems come true?  Well, only 
partially, it seems. 
Most obviously, none of the crucial timelines have been met. Neither are SIS II and VIS 
operational at the time of writing (scheduled for 2007), nor is the exchange of information 
governed by the principle of availability (scheduled for 1 January 2008). The Commission’s 
proposal as regards the latter was tabled in 2005 but appears not to be followed further by the 
                                                      
21 European Treaty Series No. 108, signed 28.1.1981. 
22 Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, […] with a view to adopting a Council Decision on the stepping 
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ C 71, 
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Council. The member states’ counter-proposal of 2007 (‘Prüm Initiative’) is still under 
discussion. Even if negotiations are finalised soon, the system would still need months - if not 
years - to be up and running as the technical requirements are considerable. In addition, one 
might wonder whether the Prüm Initiative is in fact a realisation of the principle of availability 
as envisaged by the Hague Programme. Europol, for instance, is not mentioned once in the 
member states’ proposal while it seems as if the Hague Programme wanted Europol to profit 
from the principle of availability and is accordingly involved in the Commission’s proposal. 
Furthermore, by embracing the principle of availability in the Hague Programme, it appeared as 
if European leaders wanted the EU to slowly abandon the idea of creating more large-scale 
centralised databases in the area of freedom, security and justice. In spite of this, a number of 
proposals have been tabled, with some of them ‘thinking even bigger’ than many of the existing 
databases. The ‘entry-exist system’ is one of them. Other proposals in this direction are the 
Electronic System of Travel Authorisation (ESTA), the Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (AFIS) and in part the EU register for travel documents and identity cards. In this 
respect too it seems as if the path of the Hague Programme has been somewhat abandoned. 
The picture is different, however, when looking at the issue of biometrics. Here, the Hague 
Programme called on the other actors to continue their efforts to integrate biometric identifiers 
in travel documents, visas, residence permits, EU citizens’ passports and information systems 
“without delay”. This call has in fact been heard and biometric identifiers are incorporated in all 
the newer systems, like Eurodac, SIS II and VIS. Biometrics are also heavily relied upon in the 
new Commission’s border package proposals and are a recurrent theme in most of the recent 
communications and documents. The official enchantment with this technology, however, has 
met criticism by observers who have warned against considering technology as the “ultra-
solution to the permanent state of fear”, without duly considering that it may end up creating 
more insecurity, for instance in terms of data protection (cf. Bigo & Carrera, 2004; see also 
CHALLENGE Mid-term Report, 2007, pp. 7-14).  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The main purpose of this paper is to provide detailed comparative information on the growing 
number of EU databases and systems of information exchange in the area of freedom, security 
and justice. This should facilitate the understanding of the developing, technology-based 
security architecture in the EU, its interrelations and possible implications. The following 
observations constitute a selection of the many others that can be drawn from this overview: 
•  Uneven participation of EU member states and non-EU member states in EU systems of 
information exchange not only poses problems as regards complexity and comprehensibility 
of the systems but also as regards democratic control and the coherent protection of 
fundamental rights. 
•  Actual usage of the systems of information exchange varies considerably, with some hardly 
being used at all. 
•  Boundaries between migration and asylum issues, border control, criminal law and counter-
terrorism are becoming blurred. This contains the risk that the movement of people across 
borders is conceived and treated more and more as a security issue and a potential criminal 
activity. In addition, the majority of data in EU systems to which law enforcement 
authorities have access, relates to third-country nationals. This however entails, that third-DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 11 
 
country nationals are more likely to be put under criminal investigation, simply because 
there is no comparable centralised EU-database for EU nationals.
23 
•  Control of data flows becomes increasingly difficult as more and more authorities are lined 
up to the systems. This development also entails the danger that important information is 
held back by national authorities and shared only on a bilateral basis of trust. 
•  Member states’ practice of designating ‘competent authorities’ shows huge discrepancies.  
This adds to the complexity of the systems and hampers the control of data flows. In 
addition, this discrepancy might create uneasiness and distrust among the authorities 
involved. Not every police officer or prosecutor, for instance, might feel comfortable with 
exchanging information with political bodies of other member states. 
•  Data protection standards differ between the various systems, due not only to the disparities 
of the current institutional setting of the EU (pillar division).  
•  The Hague Programme’s plans for the exchange of information remain largely unfulfilled. 
Based on these observations, the following recommendations – which are by no means 
exclusive – are put forward: 
•  Allowing more non-EU member states to participate in EU databases and systems of 
information exchange or – on the other hand – granting more EU member states to choose 
their involvement ‘à la carte’ should be critically assessed.  
•  A stronger, supranational control on member states’ diverging practice of designating 
“competent authorities” should be exerted. 
•  No new EU large-scale IT systems of the dimensions of SIS II and VIS should be agreed 
upon and established before SIS II and VIS are actually operational and have proven to be 
proportional, safe and reliable. This requires an assessment of these systems not only as 
regards their ‘efficiency’ but also as regards their legal and ethical implications. 
•  The EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator’s idea of a “Common EU Policy on Information 
Sharing” should be seriously considered and accompanied by a coherent and reinforced 
“Common EU Policy on data protection”. This policy would not only need to address the 
existing discrepancies within the pillars but also propose solutions for the time after the 
entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty (which will put an end to the ‘era of pillars’). In view 
of this, it might be advisable to suspend any further – fruitless
24 – negotiations on the 
                                                      
23 Cf. on the discriminatory effect in this regard - but concerning Union citizens on the one hand and na-
tionals of a member state on the other - also the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in case C-524/06 
(Huber), 3.4.2008, para. 21: “(…). Indeed, law enforcement and the combating of crime could, in princi-
ple, be a legitimate public policy reason qualifying rights granted by Community law. What member 
states cannot do, though, is to invoke it selectively, that is, against EU nationals living their territory, but 
not against their own citizens. If a central register is so important for effective general policing, it should 
obviously include everyone living within a particular country regardless of his/her nationality. It is not 
open to national authorities to say that fighting crime requires the systematic processing of personal data 
of EU citizens but not of that relating to nationals. This would be tantamount to saying that EU nationals 
pose a greater security threat and are more likely to commit crimes than citizens, which, as the Commis-
sion points out, “is completely unacceptable”. 
24 Cf. EDPS, Data Protection Framework Decision: EDPS concerned about the dilution of Data Protection 
standards, Press Release, 30.9.2007. 12 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
proposed third pillar framework decision on data protection
25 and start with a completely 
new proposal once the new Lisbon Treaty is in force. This would also ensure proper 
involvement of the European Parliament and judicial control by the ECJ. Furthermore, this 
new approach on data protection could consider the following elements:  
o  The European Data Protection Supervisor should be systematically involved in the 
supervision of all EU databases and systems of information exchange in order to allow 
at least one body to perceive the interrelations of these mechanisms and their impact on 
data subjects. 
o  ‘Data protection by design’, allowing for automated solutions to data protection 
requirements should be made an obligatory element in the implementation of new and 
existing databases and systems. 
•  Overambitious political timetables, as contained in the Hague Programme should be 
avoided in the future. They create expectations and thereby exert artificial pressure on the 
legislative processes. This is particularly true for a policy area as important and as sensitive 
as Justice and Home Affairs.  
 
                                                      
25 Commission, Proposal for a Council framework decision on the protection of personal data processed 
in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, COM(2005) 475 final, 
4.10.2005. | 13 
Annex 1 
The following tables provide a comparative overview of some of the major EU databases and 
EU mechanisms for information exchange, involving personalised data, in the field of Justice 
and Home Affairs. This overview is broken down into three main sections: 
1.  EU databases and information networks managed by EU institutions or bodies/agencies, 
featuring inter alia the centralised large-scale databases, like the Schengen Information 
System or EURODAC. 
2.  Common rules on exchange of information genuinely gathered by public authorities. This 
section comprises mainly EU legal acts in the field of police and judicial cooperation that 
aim to enhance decentralised information exchange directly between law enforcement 
authorities. 
3.  Common rules on exchange of information genuinely gathered by private parties. In 
contrast to section 2, the last section concentrates on EU legislation that establishes 
common rules for the public exploitation of information that is genuinely gathered by 
private parties. Commonly known examples of such legislation are the data retention 
directive or the Passenger Name Record PNR) agreements with the USA and Canada. 
In all three sections, this overview intends not only to give information on the status quo but 
also highlight some new proposals and possible future steps. 
Note on the methodology: The information provided in these tables is taken mainly from the 
legislative texts that are cited in the footnotes. In some cases the information is taken directly 
from the original texts, in other cases, it has been reformulated or clarifying elements have been 
added. In order to allow readability, the respective articles of the legal texts are not specifically 
cited. Where additional data is provided (e.g. statistical material), the source is given. In the 
section “data protection elements” the legislative texts were searched for references/statements 
on data protection, privacy or fundamental rights; additionally for any specific rules regulating 
these issues. No judgement is made however, on the quality of these data protection elements. 
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I. EU databases and information networks managed by EU institutions or bodies/agencies 
 
I.1. Active systems as of 31.3.2008 
 
I.1.1. Schengen Information System
26 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual Size  Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Costs  Participating 
States 
C-SIS 
(Central 
system) 
Persons: 
 
a) Persons wanted for arrest/ 
extradition purposes.  
 
b) Third country nationals to be re-
fused entry into the Schengen terri-
tory. 
 
c) Missing persons (minors and 
adults) or persons that for their own 
protection need temporarily to be 
placed under police protection. 
 
d) Witnesses and persons required 
to appear before judicial authori-
ties. 
 
e) Persons to be put under discreet 
surveillance or subjected to specific 
checks.  
 
Data elements include among 
others: names including aliases, 
specific physical characteristics, 
place and date of birth, sex, nation-
ality, whether the person is armed, 
violent or has escaped, action to be 
taken. 
No  Number of valid re-
cords as of 1.1.2008 
(see Council 2008, 
p. 2): 
 
Persons: 
 
a) 19,119 persons 
wanted for ar-
rest/extradition. 
 
b) 696,419 third 
country nationals to 
be refused entry. 
 
c) 24,594 adult and 
22.907 minor miss-
ing persons. 
 
d) 64,684 persons 
who have to appear 
before judicial au-
thorities. 
 
e) 31,577 persons to 
be put under sur-
veillance or specific 
checks. 
 
Information 
is supplied 
by con-
tracting 
states via 
national 
sections 
(N-SIS). 
All of these 
are con-
nected to 
the central 
technical 
function 
(C-SIS). 
 
 
Authorities responsible 
for border checks, other 
police and customs 
checks carried out 
within the country and 
judicial authorities as 
designated by the con-
tracting states. 
 
Partial access can be 
granted to visa and im-
migration authorities. 
 
Europol and Eurojust 
have partial access. 
 
In practice a wide rang-
ing set of national au-
thorities have access to 
SIS: from police, state 
security services, public 
prosecutors and judges, 
customs authorities, 
ministerial departments, 
immigration offices and 
vehicle registration au-
thorities. 
 
 
Special set of rules on protec-
tion of personal data and data 
security. 
 
Contracting states must adopt 
national rules in order to 
achieve a level of protection 
of personal data at least equal 
to that resulting from the 
principles laid down in the 
Council of Europe Conven-
tion for the Protection of In-
dividuals with regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Per-
sonal Data of 28 January 
1981 and in accordance with 
Recommendation No. R (87) 
15 of 17 September 1987 of 
the Committee of Minister of 
the Council of Europe regu-
lating the use of personal data 
in the police sector. 
 
Rules on purpose limitation. 
 
Rules on the right to have in-
accurate or unlawfully stored 
data corrected or deleted. 
 
a) Data entered for the pur-
poses of tracing persons are 
kept for the time required to 
meet the purposes for which 
they were entered. After a 
maximum of 3 years an 
obligatory review of the ne-
cessity to keep the data must 
take place (After 1 year in 
case of entry for discreet sur-
veillance or specific checks). 
However, under certain cir-
cumstances, even after dele-
tion of data in the C-SIS, con-
tracting states are allowed to 
store C-SIS data for a longer 
period in their national files. 
 
b) 10 years maximum storage 
time for other data than that 
mentioned under a). 
 
c) 5 years maximum storage 
time for vehicles, boats, air-
crafts, containers entered for 
the purposes of discreet sur-
veillance and specific checks. 
 
 
Year 2006 
 
2,07 mil-
lion Euros 
for C-SIS.  
(Commis-
sion 
2007c, p. 
11). 
 
Costs for 
the central 
system are 
borne 
jointly by 
contract-
ing states. 
EU member states 
except Cyprus, 
Romania, Bulgaria 
plus non-EU states 
Iceland and Nor-
way. 
 
UK and Ireland are 
in principle allowed 
to access the police 
and judicial coop-
eration-parts of SIS 
(not the ones relat-
ing to borders), but 
have not yet real-
ized their practical 
connection to the 
system (House of 
Lords 2007, p. 11 
and 14). 
 
Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein to 
join soon. 
 
(Council 2007a, p. 
4) 
                                                      
26 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19 as amended by Council Regulation (EC)No. 871/2004 of 29 April 2004 concerning the 
introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, including in the fight against terrorism, OJ L 162, 30.4.2004, p. 29 and Council Decision 2005/211/JHA of 24 Feb-
ruary 2005 concerning the introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, including in the fight against terrorism, OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, p. 44. See also Council Deci-
sion 2006/228/JHA of 9 March 2006 fixing the date of application of certain provisions of Decision 2005/211/JHA concerning the introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Infor-
mation System, including the fight against terrorism, OJ L 81, 18.3.2006, p. 45 and Council Decision 2006/229/JHA of 9 March 2006 fixing the date of application of certain provisions of De-
cision 2005/211/JHA concerning the introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, including in the fight against terrorism, OJ L 81, 18.3.2006, p. 46. DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 15 
 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual Size  Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Costs  Participating 
States 
 
Data revealing racial origin, politi-
cal opinions or religious or other 
beliefs, as well as personal data 
concerning health or sexuality shall 
not be registered. 
 
Note that additional information to 
an entry in C-SIS can be exchanged 
between national authorities. This 
additional information is held in the 
so called SIRENE databases of 
each contracting state. 
 
Objects: 
 
a) Vehicles, boats, aircrafts, con-
tainers for the purpose of discreet 
surveillance or specific checks. 
 
b) Objects sought for the purposes 
of seizure or use as evidence in 
criminal proceedings (e.g.. stolen 
identity cards, vehicles, firearms, 
bank notes). 
 
On top 299,473 ali-
ases of wanted per-
sons. 
 
Objects: 
 
a) 3,012,856 vehi-
cles. 
 
b) 17,876,227 iden-
tity cards. 
 
c) 314,897 firearms. 
 
d) 390,306 blank 
documents. 
 
e) 177,327 bank-
notes. 
 
A list of all authorities 
for all participating 
states having access to 
SIS is provided in 
Council doc. 6073/2/07 
REV 2, 25.6.2007. 
 
Access to stored data by data 
subject governed by national 
laws. Liability governed by 
national law. 
 
National supervisory body in 
each contracting state respon-
sible for the national sections 
of SIS. 
 
Joint supervisory authority 
composed of national super-
visory authorities responsible 
for C-SIS. 
 
Contracting states may refuse 
to act on the basis of an SIS 
alert, if they consider it to be 
incompatible with their na-
tional laws, international ob-
ligations or essential national 
interests. 
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I.1.2. Eurodac
27 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual Size  Feeding authority  Access  Data protection 
elements 
Time limits for storage  Costs  Participating 
States 
Eurodac 
–  
Central 
database 
Full 10 fingerprints and 4 control 
images of persons aged at least 14 
years who are: 
 
a) Applicants for asylum  
 
Data elements include among 
others: fingerprints and control 
images, member state of origin, 
place and date of application for 
asylum, sex, reference number 
used by member state of origin, 
date on which fingerprints were 
taken. 
 
b) Persons apprehended in connec-
tion with the irregular crossing of 
borders coming from a third coun-
try  
 
Data elements include among 
others: fingerprints and control 
images, member state of origin, 
place and date apprehension, sex, 
reference number used by member 
state of origin, date on which fin-
gerprints were taken. 
 
The system also allows checking 
fingerprints of persons found ille-
gally present in a member state 
with the existing fingerprints 
stored in Eurodac. However, the 
data of these persons are not 
stored. 
Yes Period  2003-2005 
 
a) 657,753 sets of 
data of asylum ap-
plicants;  
 
b) 48,657 sets of 
data of persons 
apprehended at 
borders; 
(Commission 
2007a, p. 5). 
Participating states – 
Eurodac national access 
points. 
 
In theory this should 
only be national authori-
ties in charge of han-
dling asylum request. In 
some member states, 
however, Eurodac is op-
erated partly or entirely 
by national police ser-
vices (EDPS 2007, p. 
12). 
National authori-
ties. See also: 
Feeding authority. 
Special rules on 
data use, protec-
tion and liability 
are provided in 
the regulation. 
 
Data protection 
directive 
95/46/EC is addi-
tionally applica-
ble. 
 
EDPS is compe-
tent data protec-
tion authority to 
monitor activities 
of the Eurodac 
central unit  
 
National data pro-
tection authorities 
supervise collec-
tion and use of 
data at member 
states level. 
a) 10 years for asylum ap-
plicants (obligatory erasure 
of data as soon as the person 
has acquired citizenship of a 
member state; obligatory 
blockage of data as soon as 
the person is recognised and 
admitted as refugee in a 
member state), 
 
b) 2 years for persons ap-
prehended at borders (data 
shall be erased if person ac-
quires citizenship, obtains 
residence permit or leaves 
the EU territory). 
 
Year 2006 
 
244,240.73 Euro ex-
penditure for main-
taining and operating 
the Central Unit. 
 
Period 2003-2006  
7.8 million Euro of 
Community expendi-
ture for all external-
ised activities spe-
cific to Eurodac.  
(Commission 2007b, 
p. 5) 
EU 27 plus Nor-
way and Iceland. 
Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein 
soon. 
 
 
 
                                                      
27 Cf. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin 
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I.1.3. Customs Information System
28 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual Size  Feeding au-
thority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Costs  Participating 
States 
CIS – 
3
rd pillar 
 
1) “Traditional” CIS: 
 
Information, inter alia, on: 
 
a) Commodities, 
 
b) means of transport, 
 
c) businesses, 
 
d) persons, 
 
for the purposes of sighting and report-
ing, discreet surveillance or specific 
checks and only if there are real indica-
tions to suggest that the person con-
cerned has committed, is in the act of 
committing or will commit serious con-
traventions of national laws. 
 
Data elements include among others:  
names (maiden name, aliases), date and 
place of birth, nationality, sex, particular 
objective and permanent objectives, rea-
son for inclusion of data, suggested ac-
tion, warning code indicating and history 
of being armed, violent or escaping. 
 
Data revealing racial origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs, as 
well as personal data concerning health 
or sexual life shall not be registered. 
 
 
No Period  2003-2006 
and covering 1
st 
and 3
rd pillar en-
tries 
 
a) 490 active cases 
(i.e. all cases 
which have not 
been deleted by 
users or automati-
cally). 
 
b) 1370 users. 
 
95% of all cases 
have been entered 
by only 5 member 
states (all figures 
Council 2007b, p. 
4). 
 
Inclusion of 
data is gov-
erned by na-
tional laws of 
member states. 
Customs administra-
tions as designated by 
member states. 
 
Other authorities com-
petent to act in order to 
prevent, investigate 
and prosecute serious 
contraventions of na-
tional laws, as desig-
nated by member 
states. 
 
Access can be granted 
to international and re-
gional organisations. 
 
Data retrieved from the 
system may also be 
used by other national 
authorities than those 
who have direct ac-
cess, by non-member 
states and by interna-
tional or regional or-
ganisations. 
Special set of rules on protection of 
personal data and data security. 
 
Contracting states must adopt na-
tional rules in order to achieve a 
level of protection of personal data 
at least equal to that resulting from 
the principles laid down in the 
Council of Europe Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to the Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data of 28 January 1981. 
 
Rules on purpose limitations. 
 
Rules on the right to have inaccurate 
or unlawfully stored data corrected 
or deleted. 
Access to stored data by data sub-
ject, governed by national laws.  
Liability governed by national law. 
 
National supervisory body in each 
member state responsible for the 
lawfulness of the entry, processing 
and use of CIS data in that member 
state. 
 
Joint supervisory authority com-
posed of national supervisory au-
thorities responsible for the supervi-
sion of the operations of CIS. 
As long as necessary to 
achieve the purpose for 
which the data was in-
cluded. After 1 year an 
obligatory review of the 
necessity to keep the data 
must take place. 
 
n/a EU  27 
                                                      
28 Cf. Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the use of information technology for customs purposes, OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 34; Council Act 
of 12 March 1999 drawing up, on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, the Protocol on the scope of the laundering of proceeds in the Convention on the use of information 
technology for customs purposes and the inclusion of the registration number of the means of transport in the Convention, OJ C 91, 31.3.1999, p. 91. Note that apart from this third pillar legal 
base, there is also a first pillar regulation. Council Regulation (EC) No. 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and coop-
eration between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, OJ L 82, 22.3.1997, p. 1. See also: Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member 
States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, COM(2006) 866 final, 22.12.2006. 18 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual Size  Feeding au-
thority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Costs  Participating 
States 
2.) Customs Files Identification Database 
(FIDE):
 29 
 
Information on ongoing or completed in-
vestigations for serious infringements of 
national laws against persons or busi-
nesses in member states. 
 
“Serious infringements” are defined as 
those punishable by deprivation of lib-
erty or a detention order for at least 12 
months, or by a fine of at least 15 000 
EUR. 
 
No National  au-
thorities re-
sponsible for 
carrying out 
customs inves-
tigations desig-
nated by mem-
ber states. 
National authorities re-
sponsible for carrying 
out customs investiga-
tions designated by 
member states. 
 
 
Governed by laws of 
member states. 
 
However, the following 
maximum periods of data 
retention are foreseen 
(automatic deletion): 
 
a) 3 years if data refers to 
current investigations and 
it has not been estab-
lished that an infringe-
ment has taken place; the 
data must be deleted ear-
lier, if 1 year has passed 
since the last investiga-
tive act. 
 
b) 6 years if data refers to 
investigation files that 
have established that an 
infringement has taken 
place but which have not 
yet led to a conviction or 
a fine. 
 
c) 10 years if data refers 
to investigation files that 
have led to a conviction 
or a fine 
 
Additionally: as soon as a 
person or business is 
eliminated from an inves-
tigation, all CIS data 
must be deleted immedi-
ately. 
 
                                                      
29 Council Act of 8 May 2003 drawing up a Protocol amending, as regards the creation of a customs files identification database, the Convention on the use of information technology for cus-
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I.1.4.Europol
30 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual 
Size 
Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for 
storage 
Costs  Participating 
States 
1.) The Information System 
 
a) Suspects or convicted persons of a 
crime. 
 
b) Possible future offenders. 
 
Data elements include among others:  
surname, maiden name, given names, 
aliases or assumed names, date and place 
of birth, nationality, sex, specific physi-
cal characteristics. 
 
Additional data on the type of crime, 
used means, earlier convictions can be 
processed. 
As of 
18.12.2006 
 
4311 of-
fences. 
 
Inputs to 
the Infor-
mation 
System by 
member 
states and 
Europol in 
2006 
amounted 
to more 
than 
50.000. 
(Both fig-
ures: Eu-
ropol 
2007, p. 
21). 
Member states, 
represented by 
their national 
units and liai-
son officers in 
compliance 
with their na-
tional proce-
dures. 
 
Europol itself 
shall input data 
supplied by 
third states and 
third bodies as 
well as analysis 
data. 
National units, liai-
son officers, the Di-
rector, the Deputy 
Directors as well as 
duly empowered Eu-
ropol officials. 
 
Indirect access by 
“competent authori-
ties” designated by 
member states. 
As long as nec-
essary for the 
performance of 
Europol’s task. 
After a maxi-
mum of 3 years 
an obligatory 
review of the 
necessity to 
keep the data 
must take place. 
 
Personal data 
relating to spe-
cific offences 
shall be deleted 
if proceedings 
against the per-
son are dropped 
or if that person 
is acquitted of 
the offence. 
Europol 
- The Europol 
Computer 
System 
(TECS) 
 
TECS con-
sists of three 
elements: 
 
1.) The In-
formation 
System 
 
2.) Analytical 
Work Files 
 
3) The Index 
System 
2.) Analytical Work Files 
 
a) Suspects or convicted persons of a 
crime. 
 
b) Possible future offenders.  
 
c) Possible witnesses. 
 
d) Victims and possible victims. 
 
e) Contacts and associates.  
 
f) Persons who can provide information 
on the criminal offence under considera-
tion. 
 
Yes, in par-
ticular as 
soon as SIS 
II is opera-
tional. 
18 Ana-
lytical 
Work Files 
in 2006. 
(Europol 
2007, p. 
15). 
Analysts and 
other Europol 
official specifi-
cally desig-
nated for each 
analysis pro-
ject. 
 
Experts from 
third states and 
third bodies 
may be “asso-
ciated” with 
the activities of 
an analysis 
group. 
Analysts and other 
Europol official spe-
cifically designated 
for each analysis pro-
ject. The liaison offi-
cers and/or experts of 
the member states 
which are concerned 
by the analysis file.  
 
Experts from third 
states and third bod-
ies may be “associ-
ated” with the activi-
ties of an analysis 
group. 
Special set of rules on protection of personal 
data and data security. 
 
Member states must adopt national rules in or-
der to achieve a level of protection of personal 
data at least equal to that resulting from the 
principles laid down in the Council of Europe 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data of 28 January 1981 and in ac-
cordance with Recommendation No. R (87) 15 
of 17 September 1987 of the Committee of 
Minister of the Council of Europe regulating 
the use of personal data in the police sector. 
No data exchange shall take place before these 
measures have not entered into force in the 
member states.  
 
Europol itself shall take account of the Council 
of Europe principles. 
 
Rules on purpose limitations. 
 
Rules on data protection requirements when 
data is transferred to third states or third bod-
ies. 
 
Specific rules on access to information, correc-
tion and deletion of in correct data.  
 
Rules on liability. 
 
National supervisory body in each contracting 
state responsible for monitoring the input and 
use of Europol data by the member state’s au-
thorities.  
 
Joint supervisory authority composed of na-
tional supervisory authorities responsible for 
Europol. 
 
As long as nec-
essary for the 
performance of 
Europol’s tasks. 
After a maxi-
mum of 1 year 
an obligatory 
review of the 
necessity to 
keep the data 
must take place. 
Year 2006  
 
Total 
budget of 
Europol: 
66.01 mil-
lion Euros 
(Europol 
Annual 
Report, 
2006, p. 
23). 
EU 27 
 
With a num-
ber of third 
countries and 
international 
bodies, Euro-
pol has con-
cluded 
agreements. 
                                                      
30 Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 2 as amended by sub-
sequent protocols. A consolidated version of the Convention is available on Europol’s website: http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/Europol_Convention_Consolidated_version.pdf. Note: a 
legislative proposal is currently under discussion to provide Europol with a new legal base (Council decision). This proposal also affects the Europol Computer System and related issues, see 
Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (EUROPOL), COM(2006), 817 final, 20.12.2006.  20 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual 
Size 
Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for 
storage 
Costs  Participating 
States 
Data revealing racial origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs, as 
well as personal data concerning health 
or sexuality shall – in principle - not be 
registered. However, if it is “strictly nec-
essary” also such data can be processed 
and stored. 
 
3.) Index System  n/a  Created by Eu-
ropol. 
Director, Deputy Di-
rectors, duly empow-
ered Europol offi-
cials, liaison officers.  
n/a 
 
I.1.5.Eurojust
31 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Actual Size  Feeding au-
thority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for 
storage 
Costs  Participating 
States 
Eurojust 
 
 
a) Persons who are the subject of crimi-
nal investigation or prosecution.  
 
b) Witnesses or victims in a criminal in-
vestigation or prosecution. 
 
Data elements include among others:  
surname, maiden name, given names, 
aliases or assumed names, date and 
place of birth, nationality, sex, place of 
residence, profession. 
 
In exceptional cases: other personal data 
relating to the circumstances of an of-
fence. 
 
Data revealing racial origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs, as 
well as personal data concerning health 
or sexuality may be processed only 
when such data are necessary for the na-
tional investigations concerned as well 
as for coordination within Eurojust. 
Yes, in par-
ticular as 
soon as SIS 
II is opera-
tional. 
Year 2006:  
 
771 regis-
tered cases 
(Eurojust 
2007, p. 19). 
Eurojust na-
tional mem-
bers, their 
assistants 
and author-
ised Eurojust 
staff. 
Eurojust national 
members, their as-
sistants and 
authorised Euro-
just staff. 
 
Eurojust may ex-
change data with 
national compe-
tent authorities of 
member states, au-
thorities of third 
countries which 
are competent for 
investigations and 
prosecutions as 
well as interna-
tional organisa-
tions and bodies. 
Special set of rules on protection of personal data 
and data security. 
 
Eurojust must take necessary measures to guaran-
tee a level of protection for personal data at least 
equivalent to that resulting from the application of 
the principles of the Council of Europe 1981 Con-
vention for the Protection of individuals with re-
gard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. 
 
Special rules on data use, data security and liabil-
ity. 
 
Access by individuals and the possibility to claim 
correction and deletion of incorrect files exists.  
 
Own data protection officer as well as independent 
supervisory authority.  
 
Own extensive rules of procedure on the process-
ing and protection of personal data at Eurojust 
were adopted (OJ C 68, 19.3.2005, p. 1). 
Generally: as 
long as prosecu-
tion is ongoing, 
has not resulted 
in a final judicial 
decision and is 
still legally pos-
sible (e.g. not 
statute barred). 
Continuous ob-
servance is re-
quired.  
 
Obligatory re-
view of neces-
sity every 3 
years. 
Year 2006  
 
Total budget 
of Eurojust: 
14.7 million 
Euros (Euro-
just 2007, p. 
52). 
EU 27 
 
Europol has 
concluded 
agreements with 
a number of 
third countries. 
 
                                                      
31 Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view of reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p.1. DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 21 
 
I.1.6. Joint Situation Centre - SitCen
32 
   
SitCen  The EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) is located within the Council Secretariat and composed of analysts from member states’ external and internal intelligence services.
33 Based on assessed/evaluated intelligence 
provided by member states’ services SitCen monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide on a 24-hour basis with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction-proliferation. 
SitCen is divided into three Units: the Civilian intelligence Cell (CIC), comprising civilian intelligence analysts working on political and counter-terrorism assessment; the General Operations Unit (GOO), providing 
24-hour operational support, research and non- intelligence analysis; and the Communications Unit (handling communications security issues and running the Council's ComCen).
34 There is no legal document that 
governs the activities of SitCen, yet it seems quite likely that personal data is in fact handled and processed. 
 
I.2. Future systems soon to be active 
I.2.1. Schengen Information System II
35 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Size  Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Costs  Participating 
States 
Central 
SIS II 
 
(SIS II 
will re-
place 
the cur-
rent 
SIS) 
a) Persons wanted for arrest for surren-
der purposes on the basis of a European 
arrest warrant (EAW) or wanted for ar-
rest for extradition purposes. In case of 
an EAW, supplementary information 
specific to the EAW procedure has to 
be communicated. 
 
b) Third country nationals to be refused 
entry into the Schengen territory.  
 
c) Missing persons. 
 
d) Witnesses and persons required to 
appear before judicial authorities. 
 
e) Persons to be put under discreet 
checks or subjected to specific checks. 
Supplementary information has to be 
provided in these cases. 
 
Yes   Estimates pro-
vided in official 
documents refer 
to searches 
conducted in 
the system, not 
to total number 
of entries. As 
regards 
searches, the 
Commission 
expects a 
growth from 65 
million to 95 
million in the 
first two years 
of the system 
(Commission 
2005a, p. 45). 
Information 
is supplied 
by con-
tracting 
states via 
national in-
terfaces 
(NI-SIS). 
 
Authorities responsi-
ble for the identifica-
tion of third country 
nationals for the pur-
poses of border con-
trol, other police and 
customs checks car-
ried out within the 
country and judicial 
authorities as desig-
nated by the contract-
ing states. 
 
Partial access can be 
granted to visa and 
immigration authori-
ties. 
 
Partial access by ve-
hicle registration au-
thorities. 
General reference to fundamental rights 
and the EU Charter. 
 
Reference to Directive 95/46/EC (i.e. 
“first pillar” data protection directive) 
for the first pillar aspects of SIS II. 
 
Reference to Regulation 45/2001 on the 
processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and 
on the free movement of such data. 
 
Personal data shall be protected by the 
Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to 
the Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data of 28 January 1981 and subse-
quent amendments thereto. 
 
Special set of rules on protection of per-
sonal data and data security. 
a) Data on persons are 
kept for the time required 
to meet the purposes for 
which they were entered.  
 
After a maximum of 3 
years an obligatory review 
of the necessity to keep the 
data must take place (after 
1 year in case of entry for 
discreet check or specific 
checks).  
 
However, under certain 
circumstances, even after 
deletion of data in the SIS 
II, contracting states are al-
lowed to store data for a 
longer period in their na-
tional files.  
 
Period 
2007-2012 
 
Estimation 
of 2005: 
114 mil-
lion Euros 
out of EU 
budget to 
get the 
system up 
and run-
ning 
(House of 
Lords 
2007, p. 
15.) 
 
 
Situation as of 
March 2008: 
 
EU member 
states (UK 
and Ireland 
partially) ex-
cept Cyprus, 
Romania, 
Bulgaria plus 
non-EU states 
Iceland and 
Norway. 
Switzerland 
and Liechten-
stein soon. 
                                                      
32 There is no public legal or policy document governing the work of SitCen; on its practical evolution see cf. W. Shapcott, Director of SitCen, Oral Evidence, House of Lords, EU Committee, 
5
th Report of Session 2004-05, “After Madrid: the EU’s response to terrorism”, pp. 53 - 62. 
33 G. de Vries, “The European Union’s role in the fight against terrorism”, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 16 (2005), pp. 3-9. 
34 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Notice of Vacancy Ref. A/015. 
35 Regulation (EC) No. 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation of the Schengen In-
formation System (SIS II), OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 4; Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Informa-
tion System (SIS II), OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p 63. Regulation (EC) No. 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 regarding access to the Second Generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) by the services in the Member States responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates, OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 1. 22 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Size  Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Costs  Participating 
States 
 
Data elements include among others: 
names including, previous names, birth 
names, aliases, specific physical char-
acteristics, place and date of birth, sex, 
photographs, fingerprints, nationalities, 
whether the person is armed, violent or 
has escaped, action to be taken, links to 
other alerts issued in SIS II. 
 
Data revealing racial origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs, as 
well as personal data concerning health 
or sexuality shall not be registered 
 
Note: supplementary information to an 
entry can be exchanged between na-
tional authorities (“Sirene”). 
 
Objects: 
 
a) Vehicles, boats, aircrafts, containers 
for the purpose of discreet checks or 
specific checks. Supplementary infor-
mation has to be provided in these 
cases. 
 
b) Objects sought for the purposes of 
seizure or use as evidence in criminal 
proceedings (e.g. stolen identity cards, 
vehicles, firearms, bank notes). 
 
Partial access by Eu-
ropol and Eurojust. 
 
Personal data proc-
essed in SIS II shall 
not be transferred to 
third countries or in-
ternational organisa-
tions. However: 
passport number, 
country of issuance 
and the document 
type of stolen, lost, 
misappropriated, lost 
or invalid passports 
entered in SIS II may 
be exchanged with 
Interpol. 
 
Specific reference to principle of pro-
portionality. 
 
Specific rules on purpose limitation. 
 
Rules on the right of information (but 
only as regards third country nationals 
who are refused entry the Schengen ter-
ritory. In the police and criminal law 
entries of SIS II, information to the data 
subject is governed by national law). 
 
Rules on the right to have inaccurate or 
unlawfully stored data corrected or de-
leted.  
 
Access to stored data by data subject, 
governed by national laws.  
 
Liability governed by national law. 
 
National supervisory authorities in each 
contracting state shall monitor the law-
fulness of the processing of SIS II data 
on their territory. European Data Pro-
tection Supervisor shall monitor the ac-
tivities of the EU personnel managing 
SIS II. All supervisory bodies shall 
meet at least twice a year. 
 
Contracting states may refuse to act on 
the basis of a SIS II alert, if they con-
sider it to be incompatible with their na-
tional laws, international obligations or 
essential national interests (this, how-
ever, is not possible for alerts on third 
country nationals which are banned 
from EU territory). 
 
On acquisition of citizen-
ship of any state whose na-
tionals are beneficiaries of 
the right of free movement 
within the Community, the 
entry must be deleted if it 
refers to an entry-ban for 
third country nationals). 
 
b) 10 years maximum stor-
age time for alerts on ob-
jects for seizure or use as 
evidence in criminal pro-
ceedings. 
 
c) 5 years maximum stor-
age time for vehicles, 
boats, aircrafts, contain-
ers entered for the pur-
poses of discreet checks 
and specific checks. 
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I.2.2. Visa Information System
36 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Size  Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time lim-
its for 
storage 
Costs  Participating 
States 
Central-
VIS 
Visa applicants, the application proce-
dure and the “visa history” of the appli-
cant. This includes fingerprints and pho-
tographs as well as among others: 
 
a) surname, surname at birth, first names, 
sex, date, place and country of birth, 
 
b) current nationality and nationality at 
birth, 
 
c) type and number of travel documents, 
issuing authority, date of issue and ex-
piry, 
 
d) place and date of application 
 
e) type of visa requested 
 
f) details of the person issuing an invita-
tion and/or liable to pay the applicant’s 
subsistence costs during the stay, 
 
g) main destination and duration of in-
tended stay, 
 
h) purpose of travel, 
 
i) intended date of arrival and departure, 
 
j) intended border of first entry or transit  
route, 
 
k) residence, 
 
l) current occupation and employer; for 
students: name of school, 
 
m) in the case of minors, names of father 
and mother. 
Yes   Fore-
seen 
capac-
ity:  
 
70 mil-
lion 
appli-
cants 
(Com-
mission 
2004, 
p. 45). 
 
Visa au-
thorities 
of the par-
ticipating 
states.  
Visa, immigration and asylum 
authorities as designated by 
participating states.  
 
Competent authorities re-
sponsible for carrying out 
checks at external border 
crossing points in accordance 
with Schengen Border Code. 
 
On request in specific cases 
also designated authorities for 
the purpose of prevention, de-
tection or investigation of ter-
rorist offences and other seri-
ous criminal offences as well 
as Europol within the limits 
of its mandate and when nec-
essary to perform its tasks.  
 
Under specific circumstances 
VIS data can be transferred to 
third countries or to an inter-
national organisation. 
 
VIS data obtained for the 
purpose of counter-terrorism 
and crime should in principle 
not be transferred to third 
countries or international or-
ganisations, but it is allowed 
in exceptional cases of ur-
gency.  
General reference to fundamental rights and the EU Charter. 
 
Reference to principle of proportionality, human dignity and 
anti-discrimination in the use of the database. 
 
Reference to Directive 95/46/EC (i.e. ‘first pillar’ data pro-
tection directive). 
 
Reference to Regulation 45/2001 on the processing of per-
sonal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on 
the free movement of such data. 
 
As far as access by law enforcement authorities is con-
cerned, participating states must ensure that their national 
data protection laws correspond to the level provided by the 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Indi-
viduals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data of 28 January 1981 and subsequent amendments 
thereto. 
 
As regards access to Europol, the Europol Convention and 
its data protection requirements must be respected. 
 
Special set of rules on protection of personal data and data 
security 
 
Specific rules on purpose limitation. 
 
Rules on the right of information (as far as law enforcement 
authorities using VIS data are concerned, this aspect is gov-
erned by national law). 
 
Rules on the right to have inaccurate or unlawfully stored 
data corrected or deleted. 
 
Access to stored data by data subject governed by national 
laws.  
 
Liability governed by national law. 
 
5 years 
maxi-
mum.  
 
On expiry 
of the pe-
riod the 
system it-
self shall 
automati-
cally de-
lete the 
data. 
 
If appli-
cant ac-
quires na-
tionality 
of a par-
ticipating 
state, his 
file and 
the links 
to it shall 
be deleted 
without 
delay. 
Period 
2004-
2009 
(devel-
opment 
phase):  
 
Circa 
70 mil-
lion 
Euro 
esti-
mated 
costs. 
 
This 
ex-
cludes 
the 
costs 
in-
curred 
at 
mem-
ber 
state 
level as 
well as 
main-
tenance 
costs 
(Com-
mission 
2008, 
p. 20) 
Situation as of 
March 2008: 
 
EU member 
states except 
UK and Ire-
land, Cyprus, 
Romania, 
Bulgaria. 
Denmark can 
choose to 
join. 
 
Non-EU 
states Norway 
and Iceland 
will partici-
pate. 
 
Switzerland 
and Liechten-
stein soon. 
                                                      
36 Council Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), OJ L 213, 15.6.2004, p. 5; Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Visa 
Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short stay visas (VIS Regulation), 2004/0287 (COD), PE-CONS 3630/1/07 REV 1, 1.10.2007; Council Deci-
sion concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investi-
gation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences, Council doc. 11077/1/07 REV 1, 11.10.2007; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending the Common Consular Instructions on visas for diplomatic missions and consular posts in relation to the introduction of biometrics including provisions on the organisation of the re-
ception and processing of visa applications, COM(2006) 269 final, 31.5.2006; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
562/2006 as regards the use of the Visa Information System (VIS) under the Schengen Borders Code, COM(2008) 101 final, 22.2.2008. 24 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
  Information on  Handling of 
biometric 
identifiers? 
Size  Feeding 
authority 
Access  Data protection elements  Time lim-
its for 
storage 
Costs  Participating 
States 
 
Links to previous applications and be-
tween applicants travelling together. 
 
National supervisory authorities in each contracting state 
shall monitor the lawfulness of the processing of VIS data by 
the participating states.  
 
European Data Protection Supervisor shall monitor the ac-
tivities of the EU personnel managing VIS. All supervisory 
bodies shall meet at least twice a year. 
 
I.3. Legislative Proposals and possible further steps 
  Aim and content of the proposals/possible further steps  
European Register of Convicted 
Persons (ERCP)
37 
This idea is part of the efforts to facilitate the exchange of information extracted from criminal registers of the member states. However, concrete legislative proposals and measures in this field have 
so far concentrated only on EU citizens (see below II.1. and II.2.). So far, a de-centralised solution where the convicting member state informs the member state of nationality of the EU citizen con-
victed, has been chosen. As regards third-country nationals, however, the Commission is proposing to consider establishing a centralised index of convicted third-country nationals. Only those ele-
ments enabling the identification of the convicted person (possibly including biometrics) would be communicated to the index. The additional data on the convictions would not be in the index but 
would need to be requested by the convicting member states.  
EU register for travel docu-
ments and identity cards?
38 
In its Communication of 24.11.2005 the Commission assumes that member states will create national databases of issued travel documents and identity cards, including biometric identifiers enrolled at 
application. In order to enhance the effectiveness of these databases, the Commission suggests establishing a register of indexes at European level or, alternatively, to interlink all these national data-
bases. This would allow a check on the authenticity of every travel or ID document issued in a member state and to determine, using biometrics, the identity of any person to whom a travel or ID 
document was issued, according to the Commission. 
European criminal “Automated 
Fingerprint Identification Sys-
tem (AFIS)”
39 
In its Communication of 24.11.2005 the Commission suggest establishing a European AFIS for police investigation purposes, combining all fingerprint data currently available in national criminal 
AFIS systems. In its Annual Policy Strategy for 2008 (21.2.2007) the Commission had scheduled “Implementing a centralised database of fingerprints” (p. 12). However, in the Legislative and Work 
Programme for 2008 (23.10.2007) this idea has not been taken up again. 
Entry-exit system?
40  In its Communication of 13.2.2008, the Commission proposes a new system to register the entry/exit of third country nationals. This new system could include the recording of information (including 
biometric data) on the time and place of entry of third country nationals, the length of stay authorised, and the transmission of automated alerts directly to the competent authorities, in case the person 
‘overstays’. The technical solution for its implementation is not decided yet. It could become part of the Visa Information System (VIS) or be realized in a new system (database). 
Electronic System of Travel Au-
thorisation (ESTA)
41 
In its Communication of 13.2.2008 the Commission proposes to analyse the feasibility of a system that would require travellers to the EU to make an electronic application supplying, in advance of 
travelling, data identifying the traveller and specifying the passport and travel details. This information could then be used for verifying whether the traveller fulfils the conditions for entering EU terri-
tory. 
Granting law enforcement au-
thorities access to Eurodac
42 
This envisaged proposal aims at allowing member states’ police and law enforcement authorities to conduct searches in Eurodac for the purposes of preventing, detecting or investigating criminal of-
fences, in particular terrorist offences. Until now, the purpose of Eurodac is to assist in determining which member state is responsible for the examination of an application for asylum lodged in a 
member state. A detailed legislative proposal has not been tabled yet. 
                                                      
37 Commission Working Document on the feasibility of an index of third-country nationals convicted in the European Union, COM(2006) 359 final, 4.7.2006: see also White Paper on ex-
changes of information on convictions and the effect of such convictions in the European Union, COM(2005) 10 final, 25.1.2005. 
38 Commission Communication, on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability, and synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, COM(2005) 597 final, 
24.11.2005, p. 9. 
39 Commission Communication, on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability, and synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, COM(2005) 597 final, 
24.11.2005, p. 8. Note that the abbreviation AFIS as used in the cited Commission’s document, is also the abbreviation of an already existing EU information system, titled “Anti-Fraud Infor-
mation System”, see e.g. OLAF Annual Report 2006, 27.3.2007, p. 19. 
40 Commission Communication, Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union, COM(2008) 69 final, 13.2.2008, p. 7-9. 
41 Commission Communication, Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union, COM(2008) 69 final, 13.2.2008, p. 9. DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 25 
 
II. Common rules on exchange of information genuinely gathered by public authorities 
 
II.1. Enacted legislation/adopted resolution as of 31.3.2008 
  Cited 
Legal 
base  
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Exchange of information on  Involved authorities  Data protection elements  Participat-
ing States 
DNA 
Analysis 
results 
(1997 and 
2001)
43 
None 
pro-
vided 
Council 
Resolu-
tion 
To make a significant contribution to the 
investigation of crime. 
Data from the non-coding part of the DNA 
molecule for the purpose of investigating 
crime. 
 
However: exchange of this data is not a le-
gally binding obligation. The resolution just 
contains suggestions to member states. 
Among these suggestions are: a) to consider 
establishing national DNA databases, b) to 
consider establishing a network of compati-
ble national DNA databases at EU level, c) 
as a second step to consider the need to es-
tablish a European DNA database. 
One contact point per member state.  Reference to the Council of Europe 
1981 Convention for the Protection 
of individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data is made in the preamble.  
 
National rules must comply with 
the Council of Europe standards. 
 
General reference to “sufficient 
safeguards concerning the security 
and protection of personal data”. 
EU 27 
Mutual as-
sistance in 
criminal 
matters 
(2000)
44 
Arts. 
31(a) 
and 
34(2) 
(d) 
TEU 
Conven-
tion 
To improve judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters between member states 
without prejudice to the rules protecting 
individual freedom. 
Any relevant information linked to the in-
vestigation or prosecution of crime with or 
without a specific request by one member 
state. 
 
Special provision foreseen for requests for 
interception of telecommunications and 
transmission. 
 
Additional protocol to the Convention 
stipulates conditions of obtaining informa-
tion on bank accounts and banking transac-
tions.
45 
Different authorities depending on the precise re-
quest for mutual assistance. 
Rules on purpose limitation are laid 
down as well as the possibility to 
refuse assistance under certain cir-
cumstances. 
 
Reference to national law and the 
European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (ECHR) in 
preamble. 
EU 27 and 
for certain 
aspects 
also Nor-
way and 
Iceland.
46 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
42 Legislative proposal not yet tabled but requested by JHA Council of 12 – 13 June 2007. See also Commission 2007a, p. 11; Commission 2005b, p. 8; Council of the European Union, Access 
to Eurodac by Member States’ police and law enforcement authorities, Council doc. 5452/07, 19.1.2007. 
43 Council Resolution of 9 June 1997 on the exchange of DNA analysis results, OJ C 193, 24.6.1997, p. 2; Council Resolution of 25 June 2001 on the exchange of DNA analysis results, OJ C 
187, 3.7.2001, p. 1. 
44 Convention established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, OJ C 197, 12.7.2000, p. 3. 
45 Protocol established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States 
of the European Union, OJ C 326, 21.11.2001, p. 2. 
46 See Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the application of certain provisions of the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union and the 2001 Protocol thereto, OJ L 26, 29.1.2004, p. 3. 26 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
  Cited 
Legal 
base  
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Exchange of information on  Involved authorities  Data protection elements  Participat-
ing States 
Money 
laundering 
(2000)
47 
Art. 
34(2) 
(c) 
TEU 
Council 
Decision 
To improve the mechanisms for ex-
changing information on suspicious fi-
nancial transactions and underlying 
criminal activity. 
Any available information that may be rele-
vant to the processing or analysis of infor-
mation or to investigation by the Financial 
Intelligence Unit regarding financial trans-
actions related to money laundering and the 
natural or legal persons involved. 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in member 
states as set up in accordance with Directive 
91/308/EC and further defined as 
“A central, national unit which, in order to com-
bat money laundering, is responsible for receiv-
ing (and to the extent permitted, requesting), ana-
lysing and disseminating to the competent au-
thorities, disclosures of financial information 
which concern suspected proceeds of crime or are 
required by national legislation or regulation.” 
Clear legal commitment to data 
protection standards as stipulated in 
Council of Europe 1981 Conven-
tion for the Protection of individu-
als with regard to Automatic Proc-
essing of Personal Data and to na-
tional legislation. 
 
Rules on purpose limitation and 
data security. 
 
Possibility to refuse exchange of 
information if this would be 
“clearly disproportionate to the le-
gitimate interests of a natural or le-
gal person or the Member State”; 
also, if it would be in breach of 
“fundamental principles of national 
law”. 
EU 27 
Football 
matches 
(2002)
48 
Arts. 
30(1) 
(a) and 
(b), 34 
(2)(c) 
TEU 
Council 
Decision 
High level of safety within an area of 
freedom, security and justice by develop-
ing common action among member 
states in the field of police cooperation. 
 
Preventing and combating football-
related violence. 
Personal data of “high-risk supporters”. 
Exchange of information, including per-
sonal data, shall take place before, during 
and after a football event with an interna-
tional dimension. 
National football information points of a “police 
nature”. These contact points shall communicate 
the information to all police services concerned. 
Reference to “domestic and inter-
national rules applicable” to data 
exchange.  
 
Council of Europe 1981 Conven-
tion for the Protection of individu-
als with regard to Automatic Proc-
essing of Personal Data shall be 
taken into account. 
EU 27 
Genocide 
and crimes 
against 
humanity 
(2002)
49 
Arts. 
30 and 
34 
(2)(c) 
TEU 
Council 
Decision 
Closer cooperation of authorities in-
volved in investigating crimes of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. 
Any available information that may be rele-
vant in the context of investigations into 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes such as those defined in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court 
of 17 July 1998. 
Authorities involved in investigating crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. Designated contact points in member 
states. 
Not specified. 
 
General reference to “limits of the 
applicable national law.” 
EU 27 
 
 
 
            
                                                      
47 Council Decision of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information, OJ L 271, 
24.10.2000, p. 4. 
48 Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension, OJ L 121, 8.5.2002, p. 1 as amended by Council Decision 
2007/412/JHA of 12 June 2007, OJ L 155, 15.6.2007, p. 76. 
49 Council Decision of 13 June 2002 setting up a European network of contact points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, OJ L 167, 
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  Cited 
Legal 
base  
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Exchange of information on  Involved authorities  Data protection elements  Participat-
ing States 
EU-US 
Agreement 
on mutual 
legal assis-
tance 
(2003)
50 
Arts. 
24 and 
38 
TEU 
Interna-
tional 
Agree-
ment/ 
Council 
Decision 
To combat crime in a more effective way 
as a means of protecting the EU’s and 
the US’s democratic societies and com-
mon values. 
Any relevant information linked to the in-
vestigation or prosecution of crime under 
certain conditions. 
 
Special provision foreseen as regards bank 
information of natural or legal persons sus-
pected of or charged with a criminal of-
fence. 
Designated national authorities of member states 
and the US responsible for investigation or prose-
cution of criminal offences.  
 
Also administrative authorities can profit from 
the Agreement provided they are competent to 
investigate criminal offences according to na-
tional law 
Rules on purpose limitation are laid 
down as well as the possibility to 
refuse assistance under certain cir-
cumstances. 
 
General reference to the “rights of 
individuals and the rule of law” in 
preamble. 
EU 27 and 
USA 
Passport 
data with 
Interpol 
(2005)
51 
Arts. 
30(1) 
(b), 34 
(2)(a) 
TEU 
Council 
Common 
Position 
To prevent and combat serious and or-
ganised crime, including terrorism. 
Present and future data on issued and blank 
passports, which are stolen, lost or misap-
propriated. 
 
Member states are obliged to exchange this 
information with the Interpol database on 
Stolen Travel Document, in parallel to en-
tering them in the relevant national database 
and the SIS. 
EU member states’ law enforcement authorities, 
Interpol as well as Interpol member states. 
Reference to data protection princi-
ples is made but adherence left to 
member states’ authorities and na-
tional laws. The same applies to 
correctness of data.  
EU 27 
Terrorist 
offences 
(2005)
52 
Arts. 
29, 30 
(1), 31 
and 34 
(2) (c) 
TEU 
Council 
Decision 
Fight against terrorism. 
 
Relevant services need to have fullest 
and most up-to-date information possi-
ble. 
Europol shall receive all relevant informa-
tion concerning and resulting from criminal 
investigations conducted by law enforce-
ment authorities in member states with re-
spect to terrorist offences. 
 
Eurojust shall receive all relevant informa-
tion concerning prosecutions and convic-
tions for terrorist offences in member states. 
Specialised services within member states police 
forces to make contacts with Europol.  
 
Eurojust national correspondents for terrorism 
matters or other competent authority. 
 
Europol and Eurojust 
Unspecified reference to national 
law as well as to the Europol Con-
vention/Eurojust decision is made. 
 
Apart from that only blanket state-
ment in preamble that the Decision 
respects fundamental rights. 
EU 27 
Criminal 
records 
(2005)
53 
Arts. 
31 and 
34 (2) 
(c) 
TEU 
Council 
Decision 
To provide citizens with a high level of 
security within in an area of freedom, se-
curity and justice. 
 
To facilitate exchange of information 
concerning criminal convictions of per-
sons who reside in the territory of the 
member states between the competent 
authorities of the member states. 
Criminal convictions of EU citizens and 
subsequent measures.  
 
Information is normally provided on the ba-
sis of a formalised request procedure. How-
ever, if a national of one member state is 
convicted in another member state, the lat-
ter must inform the central authority of the 
other member state automatically and with-
out delay. 
One or more unspecified “central authority” in 
each member state.  
Reference to the Council of Europe 
1981 Convention for the Protection 
of individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data in the preamble. 
 
Rules on purpose limitations are 
laid down.  
EU 27 
 
 
 
            
                                                      
50 Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, OJ L 181, 19.7.2003, p. 34; Council decision of 6 June 2003 concerning the signature 
of the Agreements between the European Union and the United States of America on extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, OJ L 181, 19.7.2003, p. 25. 
51 Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA of 24 January 2005 on exchanging certain data with Interpol, OJ L 27, 29.1.2005, p. 61. 
52 Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, OJ L 253, 29.9.2005, p. 22. 
53 Council Decision 2005/876/JHA of 21 November 2005 on the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record, OJ L 322/33, 9.12.2005, p. 33. 28 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
  Cited 
Legal 
base  
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Exchange of information on  Involved authorities  Data protection elements  Participat-
ing States 
Prevention 
and com-
bating of 
crime 
(2006)
54 
Non 
speci-
fied 
refer-
ence to 
article 
30 
TEU 
Council 
recom-
mendation 
The progressive establishment of an area 
of freedom, security and justice by de-
veloping common action among member 
states in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
 
To promote and ensure high level of liai-
son and cooperation between police 
forces, customs authorities and other 
competent authorities for the prevention 
and combating of crime. 
 
To achieve this, member states are en-
couraged to conclude agreements or 
other arrangements at national level. 
“…relevant information and strategic, tacti-
cal and operational intelligence, where ap-
propriate, in particular by facilitating mu-
tual direct or indirect access to databases…” 
Police forces, customs authorities and other com-
petent authorities in relation to the prevention and 
combating of crime. 
“…with due regard for individual 
rights and data protection rules.” 
EU 27 
Simplifying 
exchange 
between 
law en-
forcement 
authorities 
between 
member 
states 
(2006)
55 
Arts. 
30 (1) 
(a) and 
(b), 34 
(2) (b) 
TEU 
Council 
Frame-
work De-
cision 
To provide citizens with a high level of 
security within in an area of freedom, se-
curity and justice. 
 
To establish rules for effective and expe-
ditious exchange of existing information 
and intelligence for the purpose of con-
ducting criminal investigations or crimi-
nal intelligence operations. 
Any type of information or data which is 
held by law enforcement authorities as well 
as any type of information or data which is 
held by public authorities or by private enti-
ties and which is available to law enforce-
ment authorities without the taking of coer-
cive measures. 
Competent authorities of member states, defined 
as:  
 
a national police, customs or other authority that 
is authorised by national law to detect, prevent 
and investigate offences or criminal activities and 
to exercise authority and take coercive measures 
in the context of such activities.  
 
Agencies or units dealing especially with national 
security issues are not covered by the concept of 
competent law enforcement authority (member 
states’ practice of consigning competent authori-
ties to the Council Secretariat differs considera-
bly, see Annex 2 of this paper). 
 
Europol, Eurojust. 
 
Exchange is allowed via any existing channel for 
international law enforcement cooperation.  
Reference to the “established rules 
on data protection”, when using the 
communication channels. 
 
Reference to national law of the re-
ceiving state as regards the use of 
data which has been exchanged. 
 
Reference to the Council of Europe 
1981 Convention for the Protection 
of individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data. 
Rules on purpose limitations are 
laid down. 
 
 
Rules on confidentiality and with-
holding data. Information exchange 
can be refused, e.g. if this would be 
clearly disproportionate for the 
purposes for which it is requested. 
EU 27 plus 
Norway 
and Ice-
land. 
Switzer-
land and 
Liechten-
stein soon.  
 
 
 
 
 
            
                                                      
54 Council Recommendation of 27 April 2006 on the drawing up of agreements between police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention and com-
bating of crime, OJ C 124, 25.5.2006, p. 1. 
55 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of 
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  Cited 
Legal 
base  
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Exchange of information on  Involved authorities  Data protection elements  Participat-
ing States 
Terrorist 
kidnap-
pings 
(2007)
56 
None 
pro-
vided 
Council 
Recom-
mendation 
To successfully resolve situations of kid-
nappings by groups/individuals that can 
be placed within the spectrum of interna-
tional terrorism. 
Data on terrorist kidnappings (after a terror-
ist kidnapping has been resolved), including 
country and region in which the kidnapping 
took place, number and nationality of hos-
tages, time and date of kidnapping, time and 
date of the end of the incident, perpetra-
tors/responsible terrorist group, modus op-
erandi of the kidnapping, motivation for the 
kidnapping, involvement of a mediator, 
hostages’ reason for being in the country, 
language skills of the perpetrators, means 
used by the perpetrators to address the pub-
lic, details on the modus operandi. 
Member states through “bureau de liaison secure 
network channel”.  
 
Europol (with a view of possibly setting up a da-
tabase at Europol). 
Reference to national law is made.   EU 27 
Expulsion 
of third-
country 
nationals 
(2007)
57 
None 
pro-
vided 
Council 
Resolu-
tion 
Combating terrorism, radicalisation and 
recruitment to terrorism. 
Third-Country nationals who are subject to 
an expulsion decision issued by an adminis-
trative or judicial authority of a member 
state on the grounds of behaviour linked to 
terrorist activities or constituting acts of ex-
plicit and deliberate provocation of dis-
crimination, hatred or violence against a 
specific individual or group of individuals. 
Competent authorities of member states through 
the “bureau de liaison secure network channel” 
Neither reference to data protection 
standards nor to fundamental rights 
in general. 
EU 27 
Coopera-
tion of As-
set Recov-
ery Offices 
(2007)
58 
Arts. 
30 
(1)(a) 
and (b), 
34(2) 
(c) 
TEU 
Council 
Decision 
To investigate and analyse financial trails 
of criminal activity in order to combat 
organised crime effectively. 
Information for the purposes of the facilita-
tion of the tracing and identification of pro-
ceeds of crime and other crime related 
property which may become the object of a 
freezing, seizure or confiscation order made 
by a competent judicial authority.  
 
This entails details on the property targeted 
or sought and/or the natural or legal persons 
presumed to be involved. 
Asset Recovery Services, to be set up or desig-
nated by member states. 
Reference to “established rules on 
data protection” as well as Council 
of Europe standards. 
 
Exchange shall take place under the 
procedures and conditions of 
Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA of 18 December 
2006. 
 
Reference to national data protec-
tion laws. 
EU 27 
 
                                                      
56 Council Recommendation of 12 June 2007 concerning sharing of information on terrorist kidnappings, OJ L 214, 17.8.2007, p. 9. 
57 Council Resolution on information exchange on the expulsion of third-country nationals due to behaviour related to terrorist activity or inciting violence or racial hatred, adopted at the JHA 
Council meeting of 19.-20.4.2007, Council doc. 7159/07, 22.3.2007 and 8364/07 (Presse 77), p. 39. 
58 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification of proceeds 
from, or other property related to, crime, OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 103. 30 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
II.2. Legislative proposals and possible further steps 
  Cited le-
gal base 
Proposed 
Instrument 
Proposed Purpose  Proposed exchange of infor-
mation on/access to 
Proposed involved au-
thorities 
Proposed data protections rules  Proposed 
participat-
ing States 
Proposal: Prin-
ciple of availabil-
ity (2005)
59 
Arts. 
30(1)(b) 
and 34 
(2)(b) 
TEU 
Council 
Framework 
Decision 
To provide citizens with a high level of security 
within an area of freedom, security and justice by 
developing common action among member states in 
the field of police and judicial cooperation. 
 
To lay down an obligation for member states to give 
access to or provide certain types of information 
available to their authorities to equivalent authorities 
of other member states and Europol in so far as these 
authorities need this information to fulfil their lawful 
tasks for the prevention, detection or investigation of 
criminal offences prior to the commencement of a 
criminal procedure. 
 
Extend online access to national databases to all 
equivalent authorities of member states and Europol 
(at least online access to indices). 
•  DNA analysis files  
•  Dactyloscopic (fingerprint) 
data  
•  Ballistics 
•  Vehicle registration data 
•  Telephone numbers and 
other communication data 
(not content or traffic data, 
in principle) 
•  Minimum data for the identi-
fication of persons contained 
in civil registers. 
Equivalent competent 
authorities in member 
states and Europol.  
 
Competent authorities 
are those national au-
thorities which are cov-
ered by Art. 29 TEU 
(i.e. “police forces, cus-
toms authorities and 
other competent authori-
ties“).The equivalence 
of authorities will be de-
termined in a special 
procedure based on the 
specific type of infor-
mation and the notified 
list of competent au-
thorities in member 
states. 
 
Exchange via national 
contact points. 
Reference to privacy rights and data protection 
requirements.  
 
Framework Decision on the protection of per-
sonal data processed in the framework of police 
and judicial cooperation would govern the appli-
cation of the proposal and would provide com-
mon, EU wide standards.  
 
Purpose limitation foreseen (prevention, detection 
or investigation of the criminal offence for which 
the information is provided). 
 
Verification of quality of information necessary. 
 
Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
can justify the refusal to provide information. 
 
Data subject’s rights of access to information 
provided. 
EU 27 
Proposal: 
Organisation and 
content of the ex-
change of infor-
mation extracted 
from criminal 
records (2005)
60 
 
Note: This pro-
posal is intended 
to repeal the deci-
sion listed above 
under II.1. on the 
exchange of in-
formation ex-
tracted from the 
criminal records. 
Arts. 31 
and 
34(2)(b) 
Council 
Framework 
Decision 
Offering citizens a high level of safety in the area of 
freedom, security and justice.  
 
a) to define the ways in which a Member State in 
which a conviction is handed down against a 
national of another Member State may transmit such 
a conviction to the Member State of the convicted 
person’s nationality  
 
b) to define storage obligations for the Member State 
of the person’s nationality and to specify the 
methods to be followed when responding to a 
request for information taken from criminal records; 
 
c) to lay down the framework for a computerised 
conviction-information exchange system between 
Member States to be built and developed. 
Criminal convictions of EU citi-
zens. 
 
One or more unspeci-
fied “central authority” 
in each member state 
Reference to Framework Decision on the protec-
tion of personal data processed in the framework 
of police and judicial cooperation. 
 
Reference to the Council of Europe Recommen-
dation No R (84) on criminal records and reha-
bilitation of convicted persons as regards purpose 
limitation.  
 
Specific rules on purpose limitations are laid 
down. 
EU 27 
                                                      
59 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the exchange of information under the principle of availability, COM(2005) 490 final, 12.10.2005. 
60 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from criminal records, COM(2005) 690 final, 22.12.2005. DATABASES & SYSTEMS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY & JUSTICE  | 31 
 
  Cited le-
gal base 
Proposed 
Instrument 
Proposed Purpose  Proposed exchange of infor-
mation on/access to 
Proposed involved au-
thorities 
Proposed data protections rules  Proposed 
participat-
ing States 
Proposal: 
Stepping up 
cross-border co-
operation (Prüm 
Initiative, 2007)
61 
Arts. 
30(1)(a) 
and (b), 
31(1)(a), 
32 and 34 
(2)(c) 
TEU 
Council De-
cision 
Giving citizens a high degree of security by develop-
ing common procedures among member states in the 
field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. 
 
Making the essential parts of the Prüm Treaty of 27 
May 2005 applicable to all member states. 
Open a new dimension of crime fighting by net-
working member states national databases. 
•  DNA analysis files for in-
vestigation of criminal of-
fences (hit/no hit system). 
•  Dactyloscopic (fingerprint) 
data for prevention and in-
vestigation of criminal of-
fences (hit/no hit system). 
•  Vehicle registration data 
for prevention and investiga-
tion of criminal offences and 
in dealing with other of-
fences coming within the ju-
risdiction of the courts or the 
public prosecution service in 
the searching member state, 
as well as in maintaining 
public order and security. 
•  Exchange of personal and 
non-personal data in connec-
tion with major events with 
a cross-border dimension for 
prevention of criminal of-
fences and in maintaining 
public order and security for 
major events with a cross-
border dimension, in particu-
lar sporting events or Euro-
pean Council meetings 
(sic!). 
•  Exchange of personal infor-
mation for the prevention of 
terrorist offences in so far 
as necessary because par-
ticular circumstances give 
reason to believe that the 
data subjects will commit 
terrorist offences as defined 
in the Council Framework 
decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism. 
National contact points 
designated by member 
states.  
 
The powers of contact 
points shall be governed 
by applicable national 
law. 
 
Agencies responsible 
for the prevention and 
investigation of criminal 
offences. 
Reference to privacy rights and data protection 
requirements. 
 
Special, extensive set of rules on data protection, 
including purpose limitations, accuracy, current 
relevance, etc. 
 
Information rights, complaint mechanisms and 
damage claims of the data subject must be pro-
vided. Reference to directive 95/46/EC (i.e. “first 
pillar” data protection rules!) is made in this re-
gard. 
 
Involved authorities must ensure that data is pro-
tected against accidental or unauthorised destruc-
tion, accidental loss, unauthorised access, unau-
thorised or accidental alteration and unauthorised 
disclosure.  
 
Only specially authorised officers of national 
contact points may carry out automated searches.  
 
Implementing rules must guarantee that “state-of-
the-art technical measures are taken to ensure 
data protection and data security, in particular 
data confidentiality and integrity”. 
 
Supply of personal data is made conditional on 
the fact that the level of data protection in partici-
pating member state is at least equal to the Coun-
cil of Europe standards. The existence of this 
level of protection will need to be formally ac-
knowledged by a unanimous Council decision for 
each member state. 
 
Allowed storage time is linked to specific pur-
poses; maximum period for keeping data is de-
termined by national law of the supplying mem-
ber state. 
 
Data supplied in the context of major events can 
only be used for the specific event and must be 
deleted once the purposes have been achieved or 
can no longer be achieved (max. 1 year). 
EU 27 
 
                                                      
61 Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, […] with a view to adopting a Council Decision on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border 
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III. Common rules on exchange of information genuinely gathered by private parties 
III.1. Enacted legislation as of 31.3.2008 
  Cited le-
gal base 
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Gathering and exchanging information on X held by 
Y 
Involved au-
thorities 
Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Participat-
ing states 
Passenger 
data
62 
Arts. 
62(2)(a) 
and 
63(3)(b) 
TEC 
Council 
Directive 
Improving border controls 
and combating illegal immi-
gration. 
Advance passenger data,  
•  number and type of travel document used,  
•  nationality,  
•  full names,  
•  date of birth,  
•  border crossing point of entry into the terri-
tory of the member states,  
•  code of transport,  
•  departure and arrival time of the transporta-
tion,  
•  total number of passengers carried on that 
transport, 
•   initial point of embarkation. 
 
“Carriers” must transmit advance passenger data by the 
end of check-in concerning the passengers they will 
carry to an authorised border crossing point through 
which the passenger will enter the territory of a mem-
ber state. 
 
Carriers are defined as any natural or legal person 
whose occupation it is to provide passenger transport 
by air. 
Authorities re-
sponsible for 
carrying out 
checks on per-
sons at exter-
nal borders. 
 
Personal data 
may also be 
used for law 
enforcement 
purposes (sub-
ject to data 
protection pro-
visions of di-
rective 95/46 – 
first pillar data 
protection di-
rective). 
Directive 95/46/EC (i.e. “first pillar” 
data protection directive) is applicable. 
 
National data protection rules. 
 
Passengers must be informed by carri-
ers about data storage and use 
Data are saved in a tem-
porary file by the border 
authorities of the border 
crossing point through 
which the passenger 
will enter the territory of 
a member state. 
 
After passengers have 
entered, the data must 
be deleted by the au-
thorities within 24 
hours, unless the data 
are needed later for the 
purposes of carrying out 
the statutory functions 
of the border authorities. 
 
Within 24 hours of the 
arrival of the means of 
transportation, carriers 
must delete the data. 
EU-26 (not 
Denmark) 
plus Norway 
and Iceland.  
 
Switzerland 
and Liech-
tenstein soon. 
Data reten-
tion
63 
Art. 95 
TEC 
European 
Parliament 
and Coun-
cil Direc-
tive 
Harmonising member states’ 
provisions concerning the ob-
ligations of the providers of 
publicly available electronic 
communications services or 
of public communications 
networks with respect to the 
retention of certain data 
which are generated or proc-
essed by them, in order to en-
sure that the data are available 
for the purposes of the inves-
tigation, detection and prose-
cution of serious crime, as de-
fined by each member state in 
national law. 
Traffic and location data (including unsuccessful call 
attempts) on legal entities and natural persons and the 
related data necessary to identify the subscriber or user 
generated or processed by providers of publicly avail-
able electronic communications services or by public 
communications networks.  
 
The content of the communication is not stored. For 
more details on the categories of data, see Art. 5 of the 
directive. 
 
Competent na-
tional authori-
ties in specific 
cases and in 
accordance 
with national 
law. 
Procedure and conditions for accessing 
the retained data by national authori-
ties shall be defined by each member 
state but must be in accordance with 
the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality, EU and international public 
law, in particular the ECHR. 
 
Directive 95/46/EC (i.e. “first pillar” 
data protection directive) is applicable. 
 
Member states must ensure that private 
communication companies respect cer-
tain data security principles, which are 
further defined in the directive. 
 
Member states must designate inde-
pendent supervisory authorities. 
Not less than six months 
and not more than 2 
years. 
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  Cited le-
gal base 
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Gathering and exchanging information on X held by 
Y 
Involved au-
thorities 
Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Participat-
ing states 
EU-
Canada 
PNR 
agree-
ment
64 
Arts. 95, 
300(2) 
and 
300(3) 
TEC 
Interna-
tional 
Agree-
ment/Cou
ncil Deci-
sion 
To ensure that API/PNR data 
of persons on eligible jour-
neys is provided in full re-
spect of fundamental rights 
and freedoms, in particular 
the right to privacy. 
Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data contained in reservation sys-
tems of air carriers located within the Community that 
operate flights from the Community to Canada. 
 
API data elements include among others: 
•  A person’s names 
•  Date of birth 
•  Gender 
•  Citizenship/nationality 
•  Type, issuing country and number of travel 
document 
 
PNR data elements include among others: 
•  Name 
•  API data  
•  Date of intended travel 
•  Date of reservation 
•  Date of ticket issuance 
•  Travel agencies 
•  Travel agent 
•  Contact telephone information 
•  Billing address 
•  All forms of payment information 
•  Travel itinerary 
•  Travel status of passenger 
•  Ticketing information 
•  Bag tag numbers 
•  Seat information, including seat number 
•  all historical changes 
 
Sensitive data (e.g. racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, etc) will 
not be gathered. 
Authorities re-
sponsible in 
Canada or in 
the EU for 
processing 
API/PNR data. 
In Canada: 
Canada Border 
Services 
Agency 
(CBSA). 
 
Under certain 
circumstances 
and in a lim-
ited way, data 
may be dis-
closed to other 
Canadian de-
partments, 
agencies and 
also third 
states. 
Data will be processed in accordance 
with applicable laws and constitutional 
requirements and without unlawful 
discrimination. 
 
Legally binding rules on access to data 
by data subject, correction and nota-
tion. 
 
Joint reviews of the implementation of 
the agreement on an annual basis. 
 
First pillar data protection directive 
95/46/EC of 24.10.1995 is applicable. 
That entails that an assessment had to 
be made whether Canada ensures an 
adequate level of data protection and 
whether member state laws comply 
with the directive on certain other 
points. This positive assessment was 
concluded with Commission decision 
of 6 September 2005. 
 
The Agreement itself contains rules on 
access and correction requests of data 
by data subjects. 
In principle, the maxi-
mum storage time of 
personal data is 3.5 
years. 
 
If the data relates to a 
person that is under in-
vestigation for terror-
ism, terrorism-related 
crime or other serious 
crimes that are transna-
tional in nature (e.g. or-
ganized crime), the data 
may be stored for a 
longer period, however, 
usually for not more 
than six years. 
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  Cited le-
gal base 
Instru-
ment 
Stated Purpose  Gathering and exchanging information on X held by 
Y 
Involved au-
thorities 
Data protection elements  Time limits for storage  Participat-
ing states 
EU-US 
PNR 
agree-
ment
65 
Arts. 24 
and 38 
TEU 
Interna-
tional 
Agree-
ment/ 
Exchange 
of letters/ 
Council 
Decision  
To prevent and combat terror-
ism and transnational effec-
tively as a means of protect-
ing the EU’s and the US’s 
democratic societies and 
common values 
Passenger Name Record data contained in reservation 
systems of air carriers located within the EU that oper-
ate passenger flights in foreign air transportation to or 
from the US. 
Transfer will be automated (push/pull system). 
 
Types of PNR Data include among others: 
•  Date of reservation/issue of ticket 
•  Dates of intended travel 
•  Names 
•  Available frequent flyer and benefit information 
•  All available contact information 
•  All available payment/billing information 
•  Travel itinerary 
•  Travel agency 
•  Travel status of passenger 
•  Ticketing information 
•  All baggage information 
•  Seat information, including seat number 
•  All historical changes 
US Depart-
ment of Home-
land Security.  
 
Analytical in-
formation 
flowing from 
PNR may be 
exchanged be-
tween US and 
member states’ 
police and ju-
dicial authori-
ties as well as 
Europol and 
Eurojust. 
General reference to fundamental 
rights and freedoms, notably privacy, 
to a shared common basis of US and 
European privacy laws, Article 6(2) 
TEU and respect for fundamental 
rights and data protection as well as to 
the Privacy Act of 1974 in preamble of 
Agreement.  
 
Data will be processed in accordance 
with US laws and constitutional re-
quirements and without unlawful dis-
crimination.  
 
Periodical review of the implementa-
tion of the system by a specifically 
designated person. DHS is deemed to 
ensure an adequate level of protection 
for PNR data transferred from the EU 
and EU will therefore not interfere 
with relationships between the US and 
third countries for the exchange of pas-
senger information on data protection 
grounds. 
 
Further details are provided in a legally 
non binding Letter of Assurances for 
the protection of PNR data by the US 
Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Included in this letter are, inter 
alia the following elements: 
•  Purpose specification 
•  Access to data by data subjects 
•  Obligation to promptly delete 
sensitive data (racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, reli-
gious or philosophical beliefs, 
etc), in principle. In exceptional 
cases, however, DHS may use 
such sensitive data. 
•  Time limits for storage of data 
as provided in previous col-
umn. 
•  Information to the travelling 
public about processing of data. 
7 years in active ana-
lytical database. 
 
After the active phase, 
data will be moved for 8 
years into a dormant, 
non-operational status.  
 
Once in dormant status 
data can only be acti-
vated by certain offi-
cials and in exceptional 
circumstances.  
But: no definite maxi-
mum period of data re-
tention agreed. 
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III.2. Legislative proposals and possible future steps 
  Cited 
legal 
base 
Proposed 
instrument 
Proposed 
Purpose 
Proposed gathering and exchanging information on X held by Y  Proposed Involved 
authorities 
Proposed data 
protection ele-
ments 
Proposed time 
limits for storage 
Proposed 
participating 
states 
EU-PNR 
proposal
66 
Arts. 
29, 30 
(1)(b) 
and 34 
(2)(b) 
TEU 
Council 
Framework 
Decision 
To offer a high 
level of secu-
rity and protec-
tion within an 
area of free-
dom, security 
and justice: 
 
This Frame-
work Decision 
provides for 
the making 
available by air 
carriers of PNR 
data of passen-
gers of interna-
tional flights to 
the competent 
authorities of 
the member 
states, for the 
purpose of pre-
venting and 
combating ter-
rorist offences 
and organised 
crime, as well 
as the collec-
tion and reten-
tion of those 
data by these 
authorities and 
the exchange 
of those data 
between them. 
PNR data collected and processed in air carriers’ reservation systems by air 
carriers operating international flights to or from the territory of one or more 
member states of the EU (no intra-EU flights). 
 
“Push system” is the preferred method and should be mandatory for all carri-
ers established in the EU. 
 
PNR data include among others: 
 
Data for all passengers 
•  Date of reservation/issue of ticket 
•  Date(s) of intended travel 
•  Name (s) 
•  Address and Contact information (telephone number, e-mail address) 
•  All forms of payment information, including billing address 
•  All travel itinerary for specific PNR 
•  Frequent flyer information 
•  Travel agency /Travel agent 
•  Travel status of passenger including confirmations, check-in status, no 
show or go show information 
 
•  Ticketing field information, including ticket number, date of ticket is-
suance and one-way tickets, Automated Ticket Fare Quote fields 
•  Seat number and other seat information 
•  All baggage information 
•  Number and other names of travellers on PNR 
•  All historical changes 
 
Additional data for unaccompanied minors under 18 years 
•  Name and gender of child 
•  Age 
•  Language(s) spoken 
•  Name and contact details of guardian on departure and relationship to 
the child 
•  Name and contact details of guardian on arrival and relationship to the 
child 
•  Departure and arrival agent 
 
Sensitive data (e.g. racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or phi-
losophical beliefs, etc) will have to be deleted by the collecting authority (see 
next column) immediately. 
A Passenger Information Unit 
(PIU) for each member state 
(two or more member states 
may establish joint PIUs), re-
sponsible for collecting PNR 
data and for carrying out risk 
assessments of passengers. 
 
PIUs then transmit the PNR 
data of passengers “requiring 
further examination” to the 
relevant competent authorities 
of the same member state.  
 
Competent authorities shall 
only include authorities re-
sponsible for the prevention 
or combating of terrorist of-
fences and organised crime. 
Each member state shall 
adopt a list of the authorities 
entitled to receive PNR data 
from the PIU. 
 
Passenger Information Units 
of member states are allowed 
to exchange PNR data among 
themselves, to transmit it to 
‘their’ competent authorities 
and to request it from each 
other. 
 
Under certain conditions law 
enforcement authorities of 
third member states may re-
ceive PNR data from member 
states. 
Reference to pri-
vacy rights and 
data protection re-
quirements. 
 
Framework Deci-
sion on the protec-
tion of personal 
data processed in 
the framework of 
police and judicial 
cooperation would 
govern the appli-
cation of the pro-
posal and would 
provide common, 
EU wide stan-
dards. 
 
Rules on purpose 
limitation and data 
security provided 
in the proposal. 
 
Air carriers must 
inform passengers 
about the trans-
mission of PNR 
data to the PIUs, 
the purposes of 
their processing, 
period of data re-
tention, possible 
further uses, in-
cluding exchang-
ing and sharing of 
the data. 
5 years in active 
analytical data-
base. 
 
After the active 
phase, data will be 
moved for 8 years 
into a dormant, 
non-operational 
status.  
 
Once in dormant 
status data can 
only be activated 
by certain offi-
cials and in excep-
tional circum-
stances. 
 
Upon the expiry 
of this 8 year pe-
riod, the data 
should be deleted. 
 
However: In case 
the data is being 
used for an ongo-
ing criminal in-
vestigation of a 
terrorist offence 
or an organised 
crime against or 
involving the data 
subject, the data 
can be stored 
longer and must 
only be deleted 
once the investi-
gation is con-
cluded. 
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  Cited 
legal 
base 
Proposed 
instrument 
Proposed 
Purpose 
Proposed gathering and exchanging information on X held by Y  Proposed Involved 
authorities 
Proposed data 
protection ele-
ments 
Proposed time 
limits for storage 
Proposed 
participating 
states 
  Aim and content of proposals/possible future steps 
EU-
Australia 
PNR 
agreement 
Following a recommendation of the Commission, the Council is currently debating negotiation guidelines for the Commission in order conclude a PNR agreement with Australian authorities. All Council documents on this 
matter are restricted
67 
EU-South 
Korea PNR 
agreement 
Apparently, as of 1 March 2008 European air carriers have to transfer passenger data (22 data elements) to South-Korean authorities based on bilateral agreements between the affected air carriers and South Korea. Inter-
rogated by MEPs about a possible common EU framework in this respect, the Council replied that it has so far not been asked by a member state, the Commission or South Korea itself to negotiate a PNR agreement with 
South Korea.
68 
 
                                                      
67 Council of the European Union, Recommendation from the Commission to the Council to authorise opening of negotiations for an agreement with Australia on the use of passenger name re-
cord (PNR) data to prevent and combat terrorism and related transnational crime, including organised crime, restricted Council doc. 13742/07, 10.10.2007; Council of the European Union, 
Draft negotiation guidelines for an agreement with Australia on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data to prevent and combat terrorism and related transnational crime, including organ-
ised crime, restricted Council doc. 5861/08, 15.2.2008.  
68 Letter from Peter Schaar on behalf of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to Minister of Justice Dr. Alberto Costa, 26.11.2007; European Parliament, Written Question by Sophia 
in ’t Veld and Alexander Alvaro to the Council, PNR and South Korea, E-6007/07, 6.12.2007 with reply dated 30.1.2008. | 37 
Annex 2. The concept of “competent authority” 
The following table provides an illustration of member states’ practice in designating national “competent 
authorities” deemed to participate in EU systems of information exchange. The information is taken directly 
from the notifications made by member states.  
Source: Public register of documents on the Council website, last accessed 31.3.2008. 
Exemplary system: 
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of 
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European 
Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89) is taken.  
Article 2a of said framework decision provides: 
“‘competent law enforcement authority’: a national police, customs or other authority that is authorised 
by national law to detect, prevent and investigate offences or criminal activities and to exercise authority 
and take coercive measures in the context of such activities. Agencies or units dealing especially with 
national security issues are not covered by the concept of competent law enforcement authority. Every 
Member State shall, by 18 December 2007, state in a declaration deposited with the General Secretariat of 
the Council which authorities are covered by the concept of ‘competent law enforcement authority’. Such 
a declaration may be modified at any time.” 
  National authorities designated as “competent law enforcement authority”  Date of 
receipt 
(Council)  
Council 
document 
number 
Belgium n/a     
Bulgaria  National Police Service of the Ministry of the Interior.  21.12.2007  5023/08 
Czech Republic  1. Customs Administration of the Czech Republic 
2. Public prosecutors 
3. Police bodies – in accordance with § 12 (2) of the Penal Code of the Czech 
Republic this notion covers following authorities: 
Police bodies mean the division of the Police of the Czech Republic and the 
division of the Ministry of Interior for inspection activity in criminal 
proceedings on crimes committed by policemen. The same position in criminal 
proceedings have entrusted bodies of Military Police regarding the members of 
armed forces, entrusted bodies of Prison Service of the Czech Republic in 
criminal proceedings regarding the members of the said Prison Service, and 
entrusted bodies of Security Information Service in criminal proceedings 
regarding the members of Security Information Service and entrusted bodies of 
the Office for Foreign Relations and Information in criminal proceedings of the 
members of this Office.  
Entrusted Customs bodies have also the position of police bodies in criminal 
proceedings regarding the crimes committed by violation of customs 
regulations and regulations of import, export or transit of goods, even in the 
event that these crimes are committed by members of armed forces or armed 
corps or services and also in cases of violation of legal regulations in cases of 
acquisition and placement of goods within the Member States of the European 
Community, in case that this goods is transported across the state borders of 
the Czech Republic, and in cases of violation of tax regulations, if custom 
bodies are the tax administrators in accordance with particular legal 
regulations. 
If not specified otherwise hereinafter, the said bodies are authorised to carry 
out all the acts of the criminal proceedings belonging to the competence of the 
police body. 
20.12.2007 5004/08 
Denmark n/a     
Germany n/a     
Estonia n/a    
Greece n/a    
Spain  Centro nacional de comunicaciones internacionales (Unidad de Cooperación 
Policial Internacional de la Comisaría General de Policial Judicial) 
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  National authorities designated as “competent law enforcement authority”  Date of 
receipt 
(Council)  
Council 
document 
number 
France n/a     
Iceland National  Police  Commissioner of Iceland  15.1.2008  5663/08 
Ireland  1. An Garda Síochána 
2. The Revenue Commissioners 
19.12.2007 5337/08 
Italy  International Police Cooperation Department in the Central Criminal Police 
Directorate of the Public Security Department at the Ministry of the Interior 
(Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia della Direzione 
Centrale della Polizia Criminale del Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza del 
Ministero dell’Interno). 
21.12.2007  6181/1/08 
REV 1 
Cyprus  1. Unit for Combating Money Laundering (M.O.K.A.S), 
2. Cyprus Police, European Union and International Police Cooperation 
Directorate, 
3. Customs & Excise Department 
8.1.2008 5545/08 
Latvia  1. State Police, authority entitled to investigate any criminal offence, with 
exceptions for specialised law enforcement agencies 
2. Security Police, investigate criminal offences that have been performed in 
the field of State security or in State security institutions, or other criminal 
offences within the framework of the competence thereof 
3. Fiscal Police, investigate criminal offences in the field of State revenue and 
in the actions of officials and employees of the State Revenue Service. 
4. Military Police, criminal offences committed in the military service and in 
military units, or in the places of deployment thereof, as well as criminal 
offences committed in connection with the execution of official duties by 
soldiers, national guardsmen, or civilians working in military units. 
5. the Prisons Administration criminal offences committed by detained or 
convicted persons, or by employees of the Prisons Administration in places of 
imprisonment. 
6. the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau shall investigate criminal 
offences that are related to violations of the provisions of the financing of 
political organisations (parties) and the associations thereof, and criminal 
offences in the State Authority Service, if such offences are related to 
corruption 
7. customs authorities, investigate matters of smuggling. 
8. the State Border Guard, investigate criminal offences that are related to the 
illegal crossing of the State border, the illegal transportation of a person across 
the State border, or illegal residence in the State, as well as criminal offences 
committed by a border guard as a State official. 
9. Captains of seagoing vessels at sea shall investigate criminal offences 
committed on vessels of the Republic of Latvia. 
10. The commander of a unit of the Latvian National Armed Forces shall 
investigate criminal offences committed by the soldiers of such unit, or that 
have been committed at the location of the deployment of such unit (in the 
closed territory of the place of residence), if the relevant investigative 
institutions of the foreign state are not investigating such offences; 
11. a public prosecutor – directing the proceedings in a criminal prosecution; 
12. a judge who leads the adjudication – directing the proceedings in preparing 
a case for trial, as well as from the moment when a adjudication is announced 
with which legal proceedings are completed in the court of the relevant 
instance, until the transferral of the case to the next court instance or until the 
execution of the adjudication; 
13. the composition of a court – directing the proceedings during a trial. 
According to the national law these institutions are authorised to carry out 
investigations and they are entitled to receive data (personal data) from all data 
systems. Within their competence operational activities (intelligence) is 
entitled to perform State Police, Security Police, Fiscal Police, Military Police, 
Prisons Administration, Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, 
customs authorities and State Border Guard. 
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  National authorities designated as “competent law enforcement authority”  Date of 
receipt 
(Council)  
Council 
document 
number 
Lithuania  1. Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Ministry of the Interior,  
2. Lithuanian Police,  
3. Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania 
4. Military Police of the Lithuanian Armed Forces,  
5. Customs Department under the Ministry of Finance 
6. Government Security Department under the Ministry of the Interior, 
7. State Border Guard Service under the Ministry of the Interior,  
30.1.2008 6261/08 
Luxembourg n/a     
Hungary  1. The Hungarian Police; 
2. The Hungarian Prosecution Service; 
3. The Hungarian Customs and Finance Guard; 
4. The Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies; 
5. The Hungarian Border Guard (please note that, as of 1/1/2008, the 
Hungarian Border Guard will be integrated into the Hungarian Police). 
22.2.2208 7004/08 
Malta  Malta Police Force  22.2.2008  6931/1/08 
REV 1 
Netherlands n/a     
Norway National  Police,  authority entitled to investigate any criminal offence.  20.2.2008  6910/08 
Austria  1. The Federal Ministry of the Interior, Directorate General for Public Security 
(Bundesministerium für Inneres, Generaldirektion für die öffentliche 
Sicherheit) 
2. The security directorates 
3. The district administrative authorities 
4. The federal police directorates 
5. The Federal Ministry of Finance, Unit IV/3, for customs and tax matters 
19.12.2007 5003/08 
Poland  1. Internal Security Agency, 
2. Central Anticorruption Bureau, 
3. Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
4. Police, 
5. Polish Border Guard, 
6. Customs Service, 
7. Military Police. 
31.1.2008 6350/08 
Portugal n/a     
Romania  Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administrative Reform, which includes the 
Police, the Border Police, the Gendarmerie and the International Police 
Cooperation Centre as structures which collect and process information and 
intelligence within the meaning of the Framework Decision. 
18.12.2007 5178/08 
Slovenia n/a     
Slovakia  1. Police Force 
2. Railway Police 
3. Military Police 
4. Customs Criminal Office 
17.12.2007 5990/08 
Finland n/a    
Sweden n/a    
United Kingdom  1. All police forces in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
2. Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), 
3. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), 
4. Border and Immigration Agency, 
5. Serious Fraud Office, 
6. Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA). 
18.12.2007 5612/08 
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